After receiving Yang Hao's order, Gwon Yul ordered Joseon army to launch
the feint attack. Joseon cavalry rode around Dosan Fortress and fired
warning shots with their guns constantly, forcing the Japanese to be
constantly on their toes, as well as baiting them to waste their shots.
While the feint attack was ongoing, Joseon army also launched a probing
attack on the gate of sannomaru of Dosan Fortress. Katō
Yosaemon, who was in charge of the defence of sannomaru,
deployed taketaba (たけたば or 竹束, lit. 'Bamboo bundle') and ordered his
arquebusiers to repel them. While the attack was unsuccessful, Joseon
troops managed to pile up firewood at the base
of sannomaru before retreating, hoping that they could
set fire to the fortress once heavy rain subside.
At around 4 pm, Yang Hao once again sent Kim Ung-seo and Japanese
defectors to Dosan Fortress to call for surrender, although this time they
were simply ignored. As the sky turned dark, Yang Hao, concerned that
Japanese troops may attempt another night raid, ordered Ming troops to
stand guard over the night, and even specifically ordered Joseon troops to
stand guard together with their Chinese counterparts. On top of that, Yang
Hao also sent Kim Ung-seo and his Japanese defectors to patrol the water
wells near Dosan Fortress and attempt to entice defection of Japanese
troops that came to collect water. Despite all these defensive
arrangements, Yang Hao was still paranoid about the lie about Katō
Kiyomasa's whereabouts, so he repeatedly summoned Korean captives for
questioning to ascertain that Katō Kiyomasa was really inside Dosan
Fortress. Afterwards, Yang Hao and Ma Gui returned to the main siege camp
at Hakseongsan to oversee the construction of semi-permanent thatched
shelters (up until now, entire Ming army including its highest-ranking
commanders simply camped in the wild).
Just as Yang Hao predicted, Katō Yosaemon and Kondō Shirō Goemon sallied
out of the fortress under the cover of night to launch a night raid on
Ming camps, although they quickly discovered that both Ming and Joseon
troops were on high alert and had to abort the plan. However, as they
were returning to Dosan Fortress, they preemptively burned away the
firewood.
Day 6: A turn for the worse
February 3, 1598 (25th year of Wanli reign, 12th month, 28th
day)
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Ming army launched an artillery barrage against Dosan Fortress
from across Hakseongsan (click to enlarge).
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The heavy rain slowly subsided on the sixth day. According to some
Japanese sources, on this day some Ming troops moved their cannons to
Hakseongsan and launched an artillery barrage across the hill into Dosan
Fortress. Several Japanese troops were pulverised by cannon fire,
causing a panic to spread. Japanese troops attempted to run for cover,
but they were stopped by Katō Kiyomasa, who remained unfazed even
as some cannonballs landed near him. Katō Kiyomasa's calmness and
non-reaction misled Ming artillerymen into believing that their shots
missed the mark, so they adjusted their guns and launched the next salvo
with a higher trajectory, overshooting Dosan Fortress. It was at this
point that Katō Kiyomasa ordered his troops to act as if they were
getting shot at to further deceive the Chinese. As a result, Ming
artillerymen continued to fire their cannons using high trajectory,
missing most of their shots.
It should be noted that Chinese and Korean sources make no mention of
such artillery barrage taking place, as Ming army left its artillery
train behind (to its own detriment). If this artillery barrage actually
happened at all, it is likely that Ming artillerymen only employed a few
lightweight anti-personnel pieces such as
Fo Lang Ji (佛狼機)
for suppressive fire, rather than heavy artillery for wall-smashing
bombardment. Incidentally, some Korean sources do mention Japanese
troops shooting at Hakseongsan with "cannonballs as large as chicken
egg", presumably from an ō-deppō (大鉄砲) handheld matchlock cannon
and nearly hitting Yang Hao (he was equally unfazed), although no
specific date was given for this barrage. Perhaps Japanese barrage was a
counter-barrage in response to Ming bombardment, although the
possibility that these were unrelated incidents, or even propagandistic
embellishments that did not actually happen, cannot be ruled out.
Like the days before, Joseon troops launched an assault on Dosan
Fortress, and once again they were repelled by the Japanese. At around
11 am, yet another Japanese flotilla arrived at Ulsan and began sailing
closer to Dosan Fortress. Japanese troops inside the fortress soon
noticed something unusual about today's flotilla: instead of Katō
Kiyomasa's own banners, these ships were flying the
uma-jirushi (馬印, lit. 'Horse insignia') of Yamaguchi Munenaga
and Mōri Katsunobu.
This can only mean one thing—new Japanese
reinforcement was under way.
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Yamaguchi Munenaga and Mōri Katsunobu's flotilla sailing
from Seosaengpo Fortress to Ulsan Fortress (click to
enlarge).
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Ming troops at the river bank engaging Japanese flotilla (click to
enlarge).
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As it turned out, before Katō Kiyomasa rush back to Dosan Fortress on
January 29, 1598 (Day 1), he sent out messengers to surrounding Japanese
commanders to call for aid. Japanese commanders at Yangsan and Busan,
being the closest to Seosaengpo, received the call on January 30, 1598
(Day 2) and dispatched their relief forces the soonest. Yamaguchi
Munenaga (from Yangsan) and Mōri Katsunobu (from Busan) arrived at
Seosaengpo on the evening of February 2, 1598 (Day 5), and sent out
their ships the next day. Since both of them had only just arrived, the
flotilla only scouted the area and briefly communicated with Japanese
troops trapped inside Dosan Fortress using flag signals before reporting
back to Seosaengpo. Nevertheless, signs of incoming help raised hopes
for Japanese troops inside Dosan Fortress. At around 6 pm, additional
relief forces led by Kuroda Nagamasa, Ankokuji Ekei, and Takenaka
Shigetoshi also arrived at Seosaengpo.
Meanwhile, Katō
Kiyomasa's messenger only just arrived at Suncheon Fortress (which was
farther away from Seosaengpo). Incidentally, construction of Suncheon
Fortress was completed on the same day, and Shimazu Yoshihiro (島津義弘)
with his son Shimazu Tadatsune (島津忠恒) were hosting a celebratory
feast with other Japanese commanders inside Suncheon Fortress when
they received the news about Ulsan under siege. Due to Xing Jie's
diversionary attack, Japanese commanders at Suncheon Fortress were
reluctant to send out their full force to relief the siege. Kakimi
Kazunao even specifically ordered Shimazu Yoshihiro to stay behind
to defend the fortress, and only went to Ulsan with his own troops.
Perhaps not wanting to lose reputation for not sending out
help, Shimazu Yoshihiro later wrote a letter to his
nephew Shimazu Toyohisa, asking him to go to Ulsan in his
stead. He also dispatched a few retainers and 50 arquebusiers to
reinforce Shimazu Toyohisa's 500 troops.
The rain finally stopped by nightfall, only to be replaced by
strong westerly winds. The freezing winds took a serious toll on Ming
troops, in particular Zhejiang infantry guarding the river banks. At
midnight, Katō Shigetsugu (加藤重次), Shōbayashi Hayato (庄林隼人) and
Kondō Shirou Goemon (近藤四郎右衛門), leading a contingent of 100
mounted samurai and 300 arquebusiers, sallied out of the eastern gate of
ninomaru of Dosan Fortress to harass Ming army. They
launched a few volleys of fire arrows and arquebus shots at Ming camps
at the east side of Dosan Fortress before turning back.
Day 7: Renewed attack
February 4, 1598 (25th year of Wanli reign, 12th month, 29th
day)
The strong wind that began to blow since last night persisted into the
seventh day of the siege. At dawn, Yang Hao ordered Ming army to gather
more firewood in preparation for another attack on Dosan Fortress, as he
felt the strong wind could be helpful in spreading the fire. At noon,
another 26-ship flotilla from Yeompo arrived at Ulsan and began
approaching Dosan Fortress, and once again Ming troops guarding the
river banks bombarded the flotilla with cannons. While both sides were
busy exchanging fire against each other, one samurai and a few of his
followers suddenly dashed out of Dosan Fortress to the river bank and
began shouting to the flotilla. Although he did not understand Japanese,
Yang Hao was alerted enough that he immediately dispatched Ming Right
Division to reinforce Wu Wei Zhong's Zhejiang infantry at the river
banks, as well as asking them to be extra vigilant. Ming army repelled
the flotilla at around 5 pm.
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Japanese flotilla sailing from Yeompo naval base to Ulsan
Fortress for the fourth time (click to enlarge).
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At around 6 pm, Yang Hao ordered Ming army to get ready for the attack.
Ming troops silently approached Dosan Fortress under the cover of
twilight, carrying firewood and with their shields readied.
Unfortunately, they were spotted by Japanese sentries as they came near
the palisades of Dosan Fortress, and were forced to retreat after
suffering heavy casualties under fusillades of arquebus fire. By
nightfall, Ming and Joseon army launched a second attack with much
greater ferocity than before, ignoring casualties inflicted by Japanese
arquebusiers and moving closer to Dosan Fortress. Realising that they
may not be able to resist the assault with arquebus fire alone, Japanese
defenders were forced to bust out the ō-deppō to supplement their
firepower. The battle raged on until around 9.30 pm before Ming army
retreated.
After today's attack, Yang Hao appeared to have a
change of mind. He probably felt that trying to take the fortress by
force was no longer practical after days of consecutive failures, and
wanted to adjust his strategy to that of encirclement and
investment. To this end, Yang Hao ordered his troops to upgrade their tents into
semi-permanent thatched shelters, and urged Gwon Yul and Yi Deok-hyeong
to hasten the next delivery of supply. Ma Gui suggested Yang Hao to lift
the blockade of one side of Dosan Fortress, then ambush the Japanese as
they came out. However Yang Hao rejected his idea.
Late into
the night, a small Japanese ship sneaked back to Dosan Fortress,
presumably due to the shouting communication earlier in the day. About
30 Japanese troops came out of Dosan Fortress and attempted to board the
ship. However, they were immediately attacked by Ming troops laying in
ambush. After a brief skirmish, Wu Wei Zhong's Zhejiang infantry managed
to behead six Japanese troops, whereas Ming Right Division troops
beheaded one. The rest ran back into Dosan Fortress.
In the
meantime, Mōri Hidemoto finally arrived at Seosaengpo at around 4 pm.
Japanese commanders at Seosaengpo held a war council that night to
decide their next course of action—whether to send a relief force to
Dosan Fortress immediately, or wait for further Japanese reinforcement
to arrive before sending out help. They concluded that an advance party
would be dispatched the next day, but the majority of Japanese forces
should stay and wait for more reinforcement.
Day 8: Living hell
February 5, 1598 (25th year of Wanli reign, 12th month, 30th
day)
It was February 5, 1598, last day of the year of Chinese calendar,
and the eighth day of the siege. Dosan Fortress already ran out of
food and water, and days of exhaustion, starvation, dehydration, and
freezing winter turned the fortress into a living hell (in fact the
Japanese only managed to survive this long thanks to the heavy
downpour of the past few days alleviating some of their water shortage
problems). Japanese troops had slaughtered the last of their pack
animals for food, and resorted to munching paper and dirt on the wall
for subsistence, as well as drinking urine to sate their thirst. They
were so desperate that some sneaked out the fortress to scavenge for
leftover field ration on the frozen corpses of their fallen
comrades-in-arms, while others drank water from ditches full of dead
bodies and blood. Only the highest ranking Japanese commanders could
have some semblance of meal, but even them had to ration their food
into pinches of rice. To stave off the cold, samurai, ashigaru, and
levied labourers disregarded their social standing and bunched
together in groups of dozens of people each. Despite their best
effort, incidents like people unexpectedly drop dead due to the cold
or froze to death in their sleep were daily occurrence. In his diary,
Ōkōchi Hidemoto recorded that he was malnourished to the point of
becoming literal skin-and-bone, and that a friend of his, who he
described as a large and burly man, refused to take off his armour to
conceal his rapidly emaciating frame.
While Japanese troops were suffering inside their fortress, Chinese
troops besieging them hardly fared any better. Despite some Korean
sources claiming that Ming army was well-supplied, the reality of Korean
logistics mismanagement cannot be made more apparent by multiple reports
from Joseon officials actually present at the frontline. To sum it up,
Yi Yong-sun (이용순 or 李用淳), overseer of the entire supply operation,
ignored his duty and returned to Gyeongju for no reason, and many Joseon
quartermasters were not doing their jobs at all. Ming army ran
dangerously low on food, and the warhorses, which had not eaten anything
for nine straight days, were dying by the hundreds. In fact the
situation was so bad that Jang Un-ik and Yi Deok-hyeong, two of the
highest ranking Joseon officials, had to take the matter into their own
hands and do the jobs of their inferiors. Despite their best effort,
they only managed to secure stable food supply for the highest ranking
Ming commanders, Yang Hao and Ma Gui (as the Koreans were afraid to
anger them). Even Ming commanders had depleted their salt and sauce
provisions with no hope of resupply, and the rank and file were simply
left to their own devices. The death of more than a thousand warhorses
(and rapid weakening of the rest) had a disproportionate impact on
combat readiness of the predominantly-mounted Ming army, not to mention
the exhausted and starving Ming troops exposed to freezing temperature
for days. Joseon officials were painfully aware that given the sorry
condition of Ming army, the entire siege campaign would be thrown into
jeopardy the moment Japanese reinforcement show up. Unfortunately, they
were incapable of salvaging the situation.
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Japanese advance party and flotilla from Seosaengpo went to
Ulsan (click to enlarge).
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Leaving aside the suffering of both armies, by 7 am in the morning,
Japanese advance party from Seosaengpo had arrived at Ulsan by land and
set up a camp on a hill known as Songsan (송산 or 松山), some 12 km away
from Dosan Fortress. Meanwhile, another Japanese flotilla also arrived
at Ulsan. Unlike previous days, it did not attempt to break through the
encirclement, but waited patiently on the river.
Later in
the day, Katō Kiyomasa wrote a letter to Ming army, informing the
Chinese of his intention to negotiate for surrender. He requested
permission to let in a Buddhist monk on the Japanese flotilla to serve
as translator and draft the written agreement, on the pretense that no
one in Dosan Fortress spoke Chinese. On the Ming side, Yang Hao already
knew that taking Dosan Fortress by force would be difficult, and his
troops were in a terrible shape, so when he received news that the
Japanese were trying to sue for peace, he gladly accepted it and let the
Buddhist monk enter Dosan Fortress. After some back and forth
communication, both sides agreed to hold a peace talk in three days, in
which Katō Kiyomasa was required to personally attend. Little did
Yang Hao know, the flotilla was not Katō Kiyomasa's, but a scouting
flotilla sent by Mōri Hidemoto, Kuroda Nagamasa, Yamaguchi Munenaga and
Takenaka Shigetoshi. It had already made contact and coordinated with
Japanese troops inside Dosan Fortress using flag signals beforehand, so
when the "Buddhist monk" was allowed to enter the fortress, he brought
with him the news of the arrival of Japanese relief force, which boosted
the morale of Japanese troops tremendously. The flotilla returned to
Seosaengpo afterwards.
(It should be noted that Korean and Japanese sources strongly disagree
on which side initiated the negotiation. Many Japanese sources claim
that it was the Chinese that initiated the peace talk after being
repeatedly defeated, and the peace talk was initiated on Day 7 rather
than Day 8. However, it makes no logical sense that the Chinese would
sue for peace during the day and then immediately attack in the same
evening, so Japanese version of the event simply cannot be true. This
logical problem did not go unnoticed by Japanese historians either.
However, instead of acknowledging the mistake, later Japanese sources
such as Nihon Senshi simply alter the time of the Day 7 attack from
evening to morning to forcibly harmonise the discrepancy.)
By noon, additional reinforcement led by Nabeshima Naoshige and his son
Nabeshima Katsushige, as well as Hachisuka Iemasa, Ikoma
Kazumasa, Katō Yoshiaki, Wakisaka Yasuharu and Hayakawa
Nagamasa, also arrived at Seosaengpo.
Later in the night, Katō Kiyomasa dispatched two parties out of
Dosan Fortress to conduct a so-called "night raid" mission. Despite the
name, they were actually foragers desperately looking for food and
water. One of the parties, of about 30 men strong, headed straight to a
water well near the outskirt of Dosan Fortress to collect water.
Unfortunately, they ran into Korean commander Kim Ung-seo and a
contingent of defected Japanese troops under his command, who were
guarding the water well since Day 4. Kim Ung-seo immediately attacked
them, killing five and captured another five. Yang Hao was notified of
the incident and immediately ordered the captives to be brought to him
and interrogated. After witnessing the severely famished captives, and
learnt of the dire situation inside Dosan Fortress (according to the
captives, Dosan Fortress had completely run out of food and water, and
out of about 10,000 starving souls still alive, less than one thousand
were combat capable.), Yang Hao was finally able to put his mind at
ease, confident that the Japanese wouldn't be able to hold out for much
longer.
Day 9: An uneasy new year
February 6, 1598 (26th year of Wanli reign, 1st month, 1st
day)
Korea welcomed its Chinese New Year in tension and uneasiness.
Nevertheless, Joseon King Yi Yeon (이연 or 李昖, more commonly
known as King Seonjo) personally visited Xing Jie to give him a new year
greeting. Xing Jie gifted the king with two calligraphic scrolls to
congratulate him in advance on the victory of Imjin War, in return King
Yi Yeon wished him a prosperous new year and congratulated him in
advance on the victory at Ulsan. The two had a great time
together.
In stark contrast, Ryu Seong-ryong went to Ulsan at dawn to give Yang
Hao and Ma Gui his new year greeting only to be met with cold shoulder,
as no one at the frontline was in any mood of celebration. Yang Hao
urged him to return to Gyeongju as soon as possible to send in the next
delivery of supply, going so far as to declare that the supply problem
was so critical that even a single dan of rice should be
delivered to the frontline at the double.
The Japanese however were in even more sombre mood compared to the
Chinese and Koreans. Dosan Fortress was literally hanging by a thread,
with less than 6,000 Japanese troops alive and casualties mounting at an
alarming rate due to starvation and freezing temperature. Katō Kiyomasa
and Asano Yoshinaga wrote a joint distress letter to seven
Japaneses commanders, among them Kobayakawa Hideaki and Mōri
Hidemoto, to explain the dire situation inside the fortress. They stated
that if reinforcement didn't come soon, the entire garrison of Dosan
Fortress was prepared to fight to the last man. If the fortress fell,
they hoped that the recipients of the letter can at least bring the news
of their valiant last stand back to Japan.
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Zu Cheng Xun crossed Taehwa River (click to enlarge).
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Later in the day, Ming mounted scouts detected Japanese presence at
Songsan. Since Japanese advance party was few in numbers, Yang Hao only
ordered Zu Cheng Xun (that guarded the northern bank of Jeontan) to
cross Taehwa River to join force with Wu Wei Zhong's detachment to
monitor Japanese activities from afar.
Meanwhile, Shimazu Toyohisa arrived at Eonyang and captured Eonyang
Fortress after defeating a small garrison there. At around 2 pm, Kakimi
Kazunao and Kumaga Naomori arrived at Seosaengpo. They were
followed by Chosokabe Motochika, Nakagawa Hidenari, Ikeda
Hideuji, Ikeda Hideo, Mōri Katsunobu, Mōri Katsunaga, Akizuki
Tanenaga, Takahashi Mototane, Itō Suketaka and Sagara
Yorifusa, who arrived in succession at around 4 pm. Later in the
evening, two retainers of Asano Yoshinaga and one retainer of Ōta
Kazuyoshi slipped out of Dosan Fortress and delivered the distress
letter to Seosaengpo, arriving by nightfall. Upon receiving the
letter, Japanese commanders at Seosaengpo held an emergency
meeting, and decided that they couldn't wait any longer—the relief force
would immediately depart the next day. Mōri Hidemoto also initiated
a joint letter, signed by Japanese commanders at Seosaengpo, to report
the current status of Dosan Fortress and Seosaengpo to Hideyoshi.
Day 10: Reinforcement
February 7, 1598 (26th year of Wanli reign, 1st month, 2nd
day)
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Japanese relief force marched to Ulsan while Japanese flotilla
sailed to Yeompo Naval Base (click to enlarge).
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On February 7, 1598, the Japanese army that gathered
at Seosaengpo finally made its move. The massive relief force
departed for Dosan Fortress by both land and water route. On land,
Nabeshima Naoshige and Kuroda Nagamasa led the First Division and
departed first, with Hayakawa Nagamasa, Kakimi
Kazunao, Kumaga Naomori and Takenaka Shigetoshi acting
as ikusa metsuke (軍目付, senior military supervisor/army
superintendent). Katō Yoshiaki, Nakagawa Hidenari, Ikoma
Kazumasa, Wakisaka Yasuharu, Yamaguchi Munenaga, Ikeda
Hideo led the Second Division and departed after them, and Mōri
Hidemoto led the Third Division and departed last. On the
water, Chosokabe Motochika and Ikeda Hideuji set sail to Yeompo
to rendezvous with Katō Kiyomasa's fleet, with Katō Kiyomasa's
troops that remained at Seosaengpo hitching a ride on their ships.
Beside the main relief force from Seosaengpo, there were other
Japanese commanders that bypassed the Seosaengpo gathering and headed to
Dosan Fortress directly. Shimazu Toyohisa that arrived at Eonyang on Day
9, as well as Kikkawa Hiroie and Mōri Takamasa, who arrived on Day 11,
were some of the more notable examples. Tōdō Takatora (藤堂高虎), who
just completed the construction of Suncheon Fortress, dispatched
his adopted son Tōdō Takayoshi and subordinate Tōdō Yoshikatsu to relief
Ulsan. Matsuura Shigenobu, who also took part in the construction
of Suncheon Fortress, personally led his troops to Ulsan. Kurushima
Hikozaemon from the currently-leaderless Kurushima Michifusa
(来島通総)'s fleet (Kurushima Michifusa was killed in Battle of
Myeongnyang), as well as Kan Uemonpachi, son of naval commander Kan
Michinaga (菅達長), also brought a portion of their respective fleets to
support Ulsan.
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Bai Sai set up a second line of defence at Jeontan while Mao Guo
Qi moved to guard the river bank (click to enlarge). It should be
noted that Mao Guo Qi's movement is merely an educated guess, as
his exact whereabouts before today's order was unknown.
Nevertheless, given that Mao Guo Qi was part of Ming Left Division
and fought together with Li Ru Mei on Day 2, it's likely that he
stayed with Li Ru Mei.
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As Japanese relief force gradually gathered at Songsan, the once-small
camp set up by the advance party now became filled with all sort of war
banners. Upon receiving scout report of this sudden increase in
activities, Yang Hao immediately realised that something was not right.
He ordered Bai Sai to lead a contingent of cavalry to reinforce Po Gui
at the northern bank of Jeontan and set up a second line of defence, as
well as sending Mao Guo Qi and his southern troops to reinforce Wu Wei
Zhong's Zhejiang infantry and guard the river bank around Dosan
Fortress.
In stark contrast to the quick reaction to Japanese activities at
Songsan, the massive increase of ships and activities at Yeompo somehow
went unnoticed by Lu Ji Zhong guarding the the river mouth only several
kilometres away from it. Perhaps this was due to carelessness, or
perhaps daily harassment of Japanese flotilla numbed his sense of
danger. In any case, Yang Hao remained oblivious to the danger and made
no arrangement to defend against Japanese reinforcement from the river,
and this grave mistake ultimately costed him the entire siege campaign.
Yang Hao was so furious over this negligence that he sacked Lu Ji Zhong
later.
Later that night, Katō Kiyomasa once again dispatched his retainer to
Songsan to plea for help.
Day 11: Day of reckoning
February 8, 1598 (26th year of Wanli reign, 1st month, 3rd
day)
February 8, 1598 was the day when the peace talk was due to take
place. Yang Hao dispatched a messenger to the outskirt of Dosan
Fortress and urged Katō Kiyomasa to come out and attend the
negotiation. The Chinese had no intention to actually negotiate with
the Japanese, however. The peace talk was but a ploy to lure out and
capture Katō Kiyomasa.
Nevertheless, Katō Kiyomasa refused to show up. Yang Hao's
messenger was greeted by Ōta Kazuyoshi from inside the fortress,
who gave an excuse that Katō Kiyomasa, along with other
high-ranking commanders inside the fortress, were gravely ill, so he
couldn't attend the negotiation personally, and no one was healthy
enough to act as his representative. And thus the peace talk fell
apart before it even started.
It should be noted that different Japanese sources give different
reasons on why Katō Kiyomasa went back on his word. Some sources claim
that a Japanese defector in the Ming army secretly leaked the ploy to
him, while other sources claim that he was stopped by Asano
Yoshinaga and his own subordinates at last minute. Regardless of the
actual reason, Katō Kiyomasa took a great gamble in doing so.
Dosan Fortress was literally on the brink of capitulation, so botching
the peace talk at this critical moment put the entire fortress at risk
of being massacred should Ming army successfully capture it later.
Fortunately for him, the gamble ultimately paid off. Help would arrive
on this very day.
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Japanese fleet sailed to Ulsan, cutting off Lu Ji Zhong in the
process (click to enlarge).
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Early in the morning at around 4 am, Japanese ships that gathered at
Yeompo—now a full-fledged war fleet, began to set sail to Dosan
Fortress. Meanwhile, Joseon naval commander Yi Un-ryong, who stayed at
Gyeonju doing absolutely nothing over the entire duration of this siege
campaign, suddenly remembered he had a untouched fleet at his disposal,
and went to reconnoitre the river. What laid before his eyes was nothing
short of terrifying, as he witnessed hundreds of Japanese ships entering
Namgang River (남강 or 藍江, lit. 'Blue River', not to be confused with
another more famous
Nam River) from the sea and began sailing upstream, thronging the entire river
with hulls and masts. Shocked by the discovery, Yi Un-ryong wrote
an emergency report to Ryu Seong-ryong (who was at Gyeongju), and
then fled as far as he could. Not only Yi Un-ryong did not engage
the Japanese to delay their advance, nor retreat to Ulsan to prepare for
a defensive engagement under more favourable conditions (i.e. with Ming
support from land), he did not even bother to send a warning to Ming
army about the incoming Japanese fleet. His selfish and cowardly action,
along with Lu Ji Zhong's negligence, wasted away precious time that Ming
army could have use to prepare for a countermeasure. As a result, at
around 4 pm Japanese fleet arrived at Ulsan in force and blockaded
entire section of Taehwa River and Dongcheon River. By that time, Ming
army was powerless to stop them (Yang Hao was so embittered by the
incident that he later urged the Koreans to build more warships).
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Japanese relief force set up a new camp and began harassing Zu
Chen Xun and Wu Wei Zhong's detachment (click to enlarge).
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Around the same time, the last of the Japanese relief
force, Kikkawa Hiroie and Mōri Takamasa, finally arrived at Ulsan.
With the relief force finally assembled, Japanese Second and Third
Division marched north and set up a new camp on a hill just south of the
southern bank of Jeontan, right before the camp of Zu Cheng Xun and Wu
Wei Zhong's detachment. Trapped between the new camp and Japanese fleet
occupying Taehwa River behind their back, both of them were cut off from
the rest of the Ming army. Worse yet, they were now being harassed by
multiple Japanese war parties, each numbering 50 to 60 troops, from the
new camp.
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First Division of the Japanese relief force attempted to cross
Taehwa River only to be beaten back by Li Ru Mei and Jie Sheng
(click to enlarge).
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Seeing that Zu Cheng Xun and Wu Wei Zhong's detachment were pinned down,
Kuroda Nagamasa, Hachisuka Iemasa, Nabeshima Naoshige of the
First Division, along with Kikkawa Hiroie and Mōri Takamasa, decided to
march straight to Dosan Fortress. With support from Japanese fleet on
the river, they attempted to forcibly cross Taehwa River at a river bank
about 2 km west of Dosan Fortress. Unfortunately, their attempt was
quickly discovered by the Ming army. Li Ru Mei and Jie Sheng led a
contingent of cavalry, along with a number of Joseon troops, and
attacked them. After a fierce battle, First Division was beaten back to
the southern side of Taehwa River.
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Standoff at Taehwa River (click to enlarge).
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At this point, Taehwa River was filled to the brim with Japanese ships,
and the entire length of the southern river bank was bristle with
Japanese troops and banners. Yang Hao realised that his was quickly
running out of options. He could either call for a full retreat before
Japanese relief force cross the river en masse, or gamble
everything and attack Dosan Fortress one last time, hoping that the
defeat of Katō Kiyomasa could seriously damage the morale of the
Japanese, allowing Ming army to deal with them somehow. Yang Hao picked
the second option, and ordered Ming army to prepare torches for the
night attack. However, before Ming army launch its final assault, Yang
Hao had to make a few adjustments to Ming deployment. He tasked Ming
Right Division with maintaining the encirclement of Dosan Fortress as
well as preparing for the attack, and drew up the rest of the Ming army
into three defensive positions.
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Bai Sai and Po Gui remained at Jeotan, keeping a look-out against
Japanese relief force in the new camp. Joseon commanders Yi
Si-eon and Seong Yun-mun and some Joseon troops were sent to assist
them.
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Li Ru Mei, Jie Sheng and some Joseon troops defended the river bank
between Dosan Fortress and Jeontan against potential landing of
Japanese fleet on Taehwa River, as well as potential river crossing
of Japanese troops from the other side.
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Southern troops under Wu Wei Zhong and Mao Guo Qi were stationed
around the river confluence, guarding against both Japanese troops
at the southern bank of Taehwa River and Japanese fleet on Dongcheon
River.
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Final repositioning of Ming army before it launches its last
attack (click to enlarge).
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As for Zu Cheng Xun and Wu Wei Zhong's detachment at the southern bank
of Jeontan, they were more or less abandoned and left to their own
devices. Regrettably, since the only naval power on the coalition side
had fled, Ming army without any ships of its own would be hard-pressed
to mount a rescue operation across the river while being threatened from
at least three directions (i.e. Japanese defenders inside Dosan
Fortress, Japanese fleet on the river, as well as Japanese relief force
troops at the southern bank of Taehwa River). Ironically, as
dangerous as their position was, they were still somewhat better off
than Lu Ji Zhong, who was positioned farther away from the main army. Lu
Ji Zhong was trapped between Yeompo naval base, Japanese relief force at
Ulsan, not to mention Japanese fleet on Dongcheon River could cut off
his line of retreat at any moment. In fact, Ming army lost all contact
with Lu Ji Zhong after Japanese fleet blockaded the rivers, and no one
knew what happened to him for the remainder of the siege campaign.
While Ming army was busy preparing, Mōri Hidemoto dispatched two of
his retainers to sneak into Dosan Fortress (the fact that Katō
Kiyomasa and Mōri Hidemoto were able to sneak messengers in and
out of Dosan Fortress so easily shows the rapid weakening of Ming
troops due to lack of supply. Katō Kiyomasa had to ask for Chinese
permission to let in the "Buddhist monk" just a few days prior, but
now the encirclement had become extremely porous). The messengers
updated Katō Kiyomasa with the current status of the relief force
and its planned rescue operation in the coming days, encouraging the
defenders to hold out just a little longer.
Later that night, Shimazu Toyohisa left Eonyang and marched
towards Ulsan.
Day 12: Final Attack and Retreat
February 9, 1598 (26th year of Wanli reign, 1st month, 4th
day)
Ming army finished its preparation by midnight. Then, under the
leadership of Yang Hao, it launched one final attack on Dosan Fortress
with a ferocity second only to Day 3 assault. Ming artillerymen
relentlessly battered Dosan Fortress, setting the fortress alight, while
Ming troops set up siege ladders and attempted to climb over the wall.
Japanese defenders inside Dosan Fortress poured hails of arquebus and
ō-deppō rounds into Ming ranks, and cut down anyone that managed to
climb up. Unfortunately, days of starvation, camping in the wild under
heavy rain and freezing wind, and the death of hundreds of warhorses had
taken a heavy toll on the morale and combat readiness of Ming troops. In
stark contrast, Japanese troops were able to put everything on the line
and fought with crazed determination, knowing full well that help was
within reach. As a result, Ming army suffered heavy casualties without
making significant progress, and began to show signs of faltering and
fear. Realising the hesitation of his men, Yang Hao executed
several retreating troops for cowardice, and ordered the faltering
cavalry commander Li Hua Long to be tied up and paraded in front of the
army to maintain discipline. Ming army resumed attack with increased
ferocity. Many Ming captains led their men from the front during the
attack, often losing their lives or being seriously wounded in the
process. Among the fallen was Yang Wang Jin, a brigade commander from
Datong leading 1,000 cavalry, and the highest ranking Ming officer to
perish in the siege campaign.
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A flotilla of 90 Japanese ships on Taehwa River began to slowly
sail upstream (click to enlarge).
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While the battle raged on, a letter claiming that as many as sixteen
Japanese commanders from Gadeok Island, Angolpo, Jugdo, Busan,
and Yangsan had arrived at Ulsan with 60,000 troops was intercepted
by Ming Right Division, which reported it to Yang Hao and Ma Gui. At the
same time, Yang Hao also received report that a flotilla of about 90
Japanese ships split from the main fleet and was sailing upstream of
Taehwa River (i.e. sailing pass Jeontan), and could easily make
uncontested landing beyond the reach of Bai Sai and Po Gui and then
attack the rear of the Ming army from the west. Realising that Ming army
was under serious risk of being surrounded, Yang Hao had a brief
discussion with Ma Gui, and finally decided to call off the attack and
make a full retreat.
Shocked upon hearing the news about the retreat, Yi Deok-hyeong and a
number of Joseon officials rushed to Ming siege camp and passionately
tried to persuade Yang Hao against the idea. The Koreans even suggested
that Ming army should send a 10,000-strong detachment to occupy the
(what they considered) advantageous ground around Jeontan and the road
to Eonyang, and engage the Japanese in open battle. However, the foolish
suggestion failed to take into consideration that Japanese had total
naval supremacy, and could make landing at any point of the entire
length of Taehwa River and even Dongcheon River, so defending only the
west side of Dosan Fortress was completely pointless. Yi
Deok-hyeong also conveniently left out the fact that Joseon troops, who
were so unreliable that nearly one-half of the army deserted at the time
Ming army still had the upper hand, were now fleeing en masse in light of the worsening situation.
Unsurprisingly, Yang Hao and Ma Gui knew the unreliability of their ally
very well after fighting side-by-side with the Koreans for so long.
Given that Joseon army had abandoned the Ming army, they obviously had
no intention of being treated like cannon fodder by the Koreans. At
around 7 am in the morning, the order to cease attack and prepare for
retreat was formally issued. By 9 am, the order to retreat was also
issued, and Ming army began a full retreat. Ming infantry, as well as
wounded troops, were the first to leave the battlefield, crossing
Dongcheon River and heading east towards Gyeongju, whereas Ming
troops surrounding Dosan Fortress lifted the siege and retreated
northwards into the mountains. Cavalry commanders such as Bai Sai and Po
Gui at Jeontan, as well as Li Ru Mei and Jie Sheng at the river bank
west of Dosan Fortress, were ordered to act as rearguard and cover the
retreat for the rest of the army. Yang Hao also ordered Yang Deng Shan
to lead a contingent of cavalry to support Bai Sai and Po Gui at
Jeontan. By 3 pm, the majority of Ming army (with the exception of
rearguard and Yang Hao himself) had left, so Yang Hao ordered the
dismantling of the main siege camp on Hakseongsan and prepare for the
retreat of his own troops.
Ironically, the supply that Yang Hao had been repeatedly asking for was
finally delivered to the frontline earlier today, although at this point
the supply was nothing but extra burden for the retreating Ming troops
to carry back to where it came from. Since Ming army was unable to carry
all the supplies during the retreat, Yang Hao had to order the leftover
to be burned down to prevent them from falling into Japanese hands.
Despite this, Yang Hao still could not put his mind at ease. While
waiting for the rearguard cavalry to catch up with his troops, he
personally went to the stockpile area of the supply (at the foothill of
Hakseongsan) to make sure that everything was properly burnt down. Yang
Hao also ordered his own servants to seek out stragglers and cavalrymen
that lost their mounts, as well as scouring the battlefield to collect
discarded armours, weapons, and other materials to be burned. The
destruction of Ming war material was so complete, that the Japanese did
not even find trash inside the dismantled siege camp when they visited
the site days after, although this also caused further delays to Yang
Hao's own retreat. After making sure that nothing of value was left
behind, Yang Hao himself finally retreated at some time after 3 pm.
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Ming army lifted the siege and began to retreat. Ming cavalry were
recalled to perform rearguard action (click to enlarge).
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As for the Japanese, the defenders of Dosan Fortress quickly noticed
that Ming troops were retreating, and immediately dispatched messengers
to notify the Japanese relief force across Taehwa River. However, after
witnessing the discipline and prowess of Ming rearguard, Japanese relief
force deemed them too dangerous to attack, and thus chose a wait-an-see
approach, wasting away nearly half a day doing nothing. It wasn't until
they saw the smoke from the burning of war material, the evacuation of
the main siege camp on Hakseongsan, and even the rearguard at Jeontan
had begun to leave, that they finally decided to commence the rescue
operation. Even so, Kuroda Nagamasa and Hachisuka Iemasa of
the First Division were fearful of Ming army and hesitant to move,
further delaying the operation (unbeknownst to both of them, this act of
cowardice was witnessed and recorded by ikusa metsuke of the
First Division, and they would be severely punished by Hideyoshi because
of it).
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Ming troops stranded at the southern bank of Taehwa River attacked
into Japanese camp (click to enlarge).
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While the First Division was hesitating, Second and Third Division of
Japanese relief force inside the new camp suddenly came under attack
from Zu Cheng Xun and Wu Wei Zhong's detachment. Despite being stranded
and abandoned (Yang Hao did not even bother to inform them about the
retreat, and they were not aware that the rest of the Ming army had
left), they nevertheless stood their ground and even launched an attack
uphill. In spite of literally every odds against them, Ming
troops still fought the Second and Third Division troops led
by Mōri Hidemoto to a standstill. As such, the Second and
Third Division of the Japanese relief force were pinned down and unable
to cross the river.
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Japanese First Division crossed Taehwa River (click to enlarge).
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Meanwhile, Kikkawa Hiroie, who was positioned behind Kuroda
Nagamasa and Hachisuka Iemasa, finally had enough of their cowardice and
decided to cross the river on his own. He was reprimanded
by Ankokuji Ekei for stepping out of line and disobeying order, but
rebuked him by saying that a monk should not interfere with the matters
of a samurai (Ankokuji Ekei was a Buddhist monk) and crossed the river
anyway. Katō Kiyomasa witnessed the river crossing from Dosan
Fortress, and was so impressed by his bravery that he
thought Kikkawa Hiroie's original three flap uma-jirushi
banner was unbefitting of a samurai of such calibre. As a sign of
gratitude for being the first to save Dosan Fortress from
danger, Katō Kiyomasa gifted his own personal banner, a
silver-coloured nine flap uma-jirushi, to Kikkawa
Hiroie after the battle was over, of which Kikkawa Hiroie later added
another four flaps to the banner and changed its colour to red. On the
other hand, due to the little episode between the two, Ankokuji
Ekei would later deliberately withhold information of Kikkawa Hiroie's
bravery and exploits in his report to Hideyoshi and Mōri
Terumoto (毛利輝元).
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Replica of Kikkawa Hiroie's thirteen flap uma-jirushi
displayed at the entrance of Sengoku no Niwa Museum of History
(戦国の庭歴史館), Hiroshima, Japan.
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With Kikkawa Hiroie taking the lead, the rest of the First Division
finally got their act together and crossed Taehwa River to attack Ming
rearguard. At the same time, Japanese fleet on Dongcheon River began to
made landing, whereas Japanese troops inside Dosan Fortress also opened
its gates and poured out to support the First Division. As most of the
Ming army had left, Ming rearguard realised that they could not resist
the landing of Japanese relief force while being threatened from three
sides, so they only briefly clashed with the Japanese before retreating
(Kikkawa Hiroie, who was the first to cross the river and engaged in
combat, only managed to kill six Ming troops). After repelling Ming
rearguard, Japanese First Division established a beachhead at the
northern bank of Taehwa River. Kikkawa Hiroie, being bold as ever,
raced ahead of the rest of the First Division and
recaptured Byeongyeongseong. His decisive action successfully cut
off Yang Hao's line of retreat to Gyeongju.
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Kikkawa Hiroie recaptured Byeongyeongseong, forcing Yang Hao to
change direction. Ming rearguard engaged and repelled Japanese
pursuers from Dongcheon River (click to enlarge).
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With his eastern line of retreat cut off, Yang Hao was forced to retreat
westwards to Eonyang. Seeing that Ming army was retreating, funateshū
(船手眾, naval troops) of Japanese fleet and Katō Kiyomasa's Seosaengpo
troops that were hitching a ride on their ships seized the opportunity
and disembarked at Dongcheon River with 200 to 300 arquebuses to
chase after Ming army. Unfortunately, they ran into Ming rearguard a
mere 300 m from the river bank. Bai Sai and Yang Deng Shan immediately
launched a cavalry countercharge, shooting dead several Japanese troops,
beheading eight more, and drove the rest back to their ships. In
addition, the First Division of the Japanese relief force was still in
the process of crossing Taehwa River and had not yet amassed enough
troops to begin the pursuit operation, whereas Second and Third Division
were pinned down in their camp thanks to the action of Zu Cheng Xun
and Wu Wei Zhong's detachment. As such, Yang Hao was able to retreat in
relative safety.
With the last of the Ming army retreating, Dosan Fortress was finally
spared from its doom. Japanese ships on the river began delivering food
and supply into the fortress, and many starving troops immediately
gorged themselves full the moment they saw food. Unfortunately, this
resulted in even more death due to
refeeding syndrome.
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Shimazu Toyohisa blocked Yang Hao's line of retreat, forcing him
to turn north (click to enlarge).
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Meanwhile, Shimazu Toyohisa, who came to Ulsan from Eonyang, joined
force with the Japanese troops that disembarked from the 90-ship
flotilla and blockaded the road, cutting off Yang Hao's line of retreat
once again and forcing him to turn north and take the long
mountain route to Gyeongju. While Ming army was switching route, Shimazu
Toyohisa personally rode ahead of his army and attacked alone, beheading
two Ming troops but was lightly injured in his left ear. However,
Shimazu Toyohisa's troops consisted of foot soldiers that could not keep
up with him, so he was unable to prevent Ming army from leaving.
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Wu Wei Zhong's detachment forcibly crossed Taehwa River under
heavy fire (click to enlarge).
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Zu Cheng Xun stormed through Japanese camp and sneaked to
Seosaengpo Fortress (click to enlarge).
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At the southern bank of Jeontan, the fierce battle in the new camp had
finally begun to shift in Japanese favour. It was an unwinnable
battle from the start, as Ming troops were starving, exhausted, and
outnumbered, not to mention they were attacking uphill against a
well-defended Japanese position held by fresh troops. As the situation
became untenable, Wu Wei Zhong's detachment decided to call off the
attack and retreat northwards, forcibly crossing Taehwa River under
heavy fire from Japanese ships on the river and pursuing Japanese troops
from the camp. As a result, Wu Wei Zhong's detachment suffered heavy
casualties, losing as many as 200 troops in battle and during retreat.
On the other hand, Zu Cheng Xun had a different idea. Instead of
retreating to the north, he gathered his retinue cavalry and
charged through the camp. In the ensuing fierce battle, Zu Cheng Xun's
own horse was shot out from under him, and many of his retinue cavalry
also lost their mounts. Nevertheless, they still managed to break out of
Japanese encirclement and escaped south. Still unsatisfied with the
outcome, Zu Cheng Xun and his troops sneaked to Seosaengpo Fortress
(now largely empty since most Japanese troops had left for Ulsan) later
that night and stole the signboard on its bridge before slipping back to
friendly territory.
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Japanese Second and Third Division crossed Taehwa River,
captured Hakseongsan, and rendezvoused with First Division
(click to enlarge).
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After the attack on Japanese camp was dealt with, Second and Third
Division of the Japanese relief force were finally able to cross Taehwa
River. They occupied a high ground near the northern bank of Jeontan,
but did not immediately chase after Ming army. Instead, Mōri Hidemoto
assigned his troops to guard the high ground, while Second Division
moved towards Dosan Fortress to capture the (now vacant)
Hakseongsan and rendezvous with First Division. In the mean time, First
Division also completed its river crossing.
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Final encounter behind the hill of Baegamsa Temple (click to
enlarge).
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With Dosan Fortress completely secured and large numbers of troops
congregating together, Kuroda Nagamasa finally gathered enough
courage to begin the mopping up and pursuit operation in the earnest.
Japanese relief force successfully killed a number of stragglers, and
was able to quickly close the distance with the retreating Ming army,
finally catching up with Yang Hao's troops behind the hill of Baegamsa
Temple (백암사 or 白奄寺, present day
Baeg-yangsa Temple), about 4.8 km away from Ulsan Fortress Complex. To shake off the
pursuers, Yang Hao once again ordered Ming rearguard cavalry to cover
the retreat. Li Ru Mei and Jie Sheng launched a cavalry charge against
the Japanese, killing a number of Japanese troops and drove the rest
away. However, after Ming rearguard cavalry returned to their formation,
Japanese relief force resumed its pursuit and began trailing the Ming
army from a safe distance for another 3 km. The tense stare-off was
finally broken when two mounted samurai carrying white banners rode
closer to the Ming army to probe its response. Both of them were
promptly beheaded by Ma Yun (麻雲) and Wang Guo (王果), Ma Gui's retinue
cavalry. Seeing that Ming army closely guarded its retreat,
Japanese relief force finally gave up and returned to Ulsan.
And that left us with Lu Ji Zhong. Due to the fact that he lost all
contact with the rest of the Ming army and no one knew what happened to
him, most Korean sources presume that his entire unit of 2,100 troops
was wiped up to the last man. However, it can be known from other
sources that Lu Ji Zhong was later sacked by Yang Hao, and the command
of his troops was transferred to his successor, Chen Chan (陳蠶), who
later had a merger with another 1,600 troops to make a 3,000-strong
combined regiment. In other words, despite suffering the heaviest
casualties among all Ming units, Lu Ji Zhong still managed to escape
with large portion (1,400 troops out of 2,100 total) of his unit intact.
Aftermath
Having rid of the pursuers at last, Yang Hao returned to Gyeongju
safely, although he only made a brief stop at Gyeongju before heading
to Andong. Meanwhile, Japanese relief force also returned from the
pursuit and encamped at Ulsan Eupseong (Ulsan walled town). Later that
night, commanders of the relief force went to Dosan Fortress to meet
the commanders of Dosan Fortress. Katō Kiyomasa, Asano Yoshinaga,
and Ōta Kazuyoshi then wrote a joint final report back to Japan,
detailing the entire siege and relief of Ulsan.
A day after the siege (February 11, 1598), Ryu Seong-ryong saw that
there were still many surplus supply meant for Ming army left in
Gyeongju, so he ordered Seong An-ui (성안의 or 成安義) to
distribute the supply among Joseon troops, under the pretense of
preventing the supply from falling into Japanese hands (he later
proclaimed that the Koreans did their utmost to keep the frontline
well-supplied, notwithstanding the fact that Ming troops starved at the
frontline while supplies continued to pile up in Gyeongju). In addition,
Ryu Seong-ryong and Gwon Yul managed to rally about 800 Joseon
stragglers returning from Ulsan and stationed them in Gyeongju to defend
against potential Japanese attack, but allowed the rest to return home.
On the Chinese side, despite the failure of the siege campaign, Ming
army still took up the defence of Korea. At the beginning of March, some
Ming commanders that returned from Ulsan (as well as additional
commanders that entered Korea after the siege) were reassigned to defend
various places in Korea: Li Fang Chun, Lu Ji Zhong, Li Hua Long, Lu De
Gong and Niu Bo Ying (牛伯英) were assigned to defend Andong; Ye Bang
Ron (葉邦榮) to Yonggung; Wu Wei Zhong to Chungju; Chen Yu Wen to
Suwon; Lan Fang Wei (藍芳威) to Jiksan; Li Ning (李寧) to Gongju;
Dong Zheng Yi, Chai Deng Ke (柴登科) and Qin De Gui (秦德貴) to Jeonju;
as well as Bai Sai to Anseong. The rest of the Ming army gradually
returned to Hanseong, as were Ma Gui and Yang Hao, who returned to
Hanseong on March 14 and March 22 respectively.
Analysis
From the onset, this blog post dispelled several prevailing myths about
Siege of Ulsan, as well as Imjin War in general, including but not
limited to:
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"Ulsan Japanese Castle" was a single castle (it was actually a
massive multi-fortress complex, as were all other Waeseong in
Korea);
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Ming army suffered heavy casualties due to undisciplined retreat,
leaving its troops vulnerable to Japanese pursuit (Ming army
actually retreated in good order and protected its rear remarkably
well, and only suffered relatively light casualties);
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The disorganised retreat was caused by Yang Hao fleeing before his
army, causing the rest to break ranks (Yang Hao actually stayed
behind and was among the last to retreat);
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Japanese fortification design and mastery of matchlock firearms
conferred them unique advantages against contemporary Chinese siege
tactics (on the contrary, Ming army quickly captured all but one
fortresses of the entire complex, and nearly captured the last
one).
That said, the strategic implication of Siege of Ulsan actually goes
well beyond debunking a few myths. However, in order to fully grasp the
impact and importance of this battle, one must look at the big picture
of the second invasion, both before and after the siege campaign.
As mentioned in the prelude, after the breaking down of peace talk in
1597, Toyotomi Hideyoshi launched the second invasion with
never-before-seen ferocity. Neither Joseon military nor righteous army
was able to put up any meaningful resistance against the Japanese
onslaught, and Joseon navy, the crown jewel of Joseon military might,
was virtually obliterated during Battle of Chilcheollyang. Even Jeolla
Province that survived the first invasion fell into Japanese hands.
Essentially, the war unfolded much like the first invasion, only this
time Joseon Kingdom was already devastated, its military in shambles,
and its naval dominance completely undermined.
To put things into perspective, in 1592 (before the first invasion),
Joseon army had 180,000 troops stationed around the vicinity of Hanseong
alone, and could muster as many as 400,000 conscripts using
Hosu-Boin system (호수보인 or 戶首保人, a system where one
soldier, known as Hosu, was supported by tax revenue from several common
folks, known as Boin) should the need arise. Even after Joseon army
suffered heavy losses during the first invasion, a census conducted in
early 1593 shows that the combined strength of Joseon army, Joseon navy,
and various
righteous army
groups of entire Korea still numbered 172,400, with Jeolla Proving
having 10,000 army troops and 15,000 naval troops, and Gyeongsang
Province having 35,000 troops stationed at Ulsan and Andong. However, by
mid-1597 (before the second invasion), Joseon military had deteriorated
to the point that there were only 1,500 troops left in Jeolla Left
Province, as well as 11,100 army troops and 5,000 naval troops in
Gyeongsang Province.
As if such terrible state wasn't bad enough, Japanese army once again
wreaked havoc across Korea during the second invasion, further degrading
the strength of Joseon military. By the time Ming army was preparing to
attack Ulsan, Gyeongsang Province could barely scrape together 3,000
troops to support the effort. Moreover, Jeolla Province fared even worse
than Gyeongsang Province. At the beginning of February 1598, Yi Kwang-ag
(이광악 or 李光岳), Army Commander of Jeolla Province, only had 500
troops under his command, most of them rabbles. Other Jeolla commanders
fared even worse, even better-off commanders barely had 70~200 men under
arms, and many could not muster even a single troop. Even the
once-numerous righteous army of Jeolla Province had been shattered into
fractured warbands numbering only 20~70 men per band.
The crisis was so dire that Hanseong once again came under grave
danger of being captured by the Japanese. Residents of Hanseong fled the
city en masse, almost hollowed out the capital, and even
Joseon King Yi Yeon was contemplating to send his princes and harem away
to safety. Although Hanseong was ultimately spared from this terrible
fate because Japanese invaders decided to halt the attack and
consolidate, the Koreans understood that the crisis was far from
averted: The Japanese held all the cards and could resume aggression at
any moment; both Joseon army and navy were ravaged and toothless, and
the prospect of evicting the invaders from Korean lands was looking
increasingly bleak.
As such, Ming intervention was the last, and in fact only, hope for
Korea. The fact that Ming Dynasty sent in reinforcement at all was
already greatly inspiring, and the news of Katō Kiyomasa's defeat
at the hands of Ming army during the early phase of Siege of Ulsan was
cause for celebration. Even after the failure of the siege campaign,
contemporary Koreans mostly expressed disappointment and regret that
Ming army wasn't able to finish off Katō Kiyomasa once and for all,
rather than seeing it as a debacle/complete failure.
As much as Siege of Ulsan motivated the Koreans, its impact on the
Japanese was even more profound. On October 19, 1597, two days after
Battle of Jiksan, Japanese commanders held a war council
at Jincheon. During the council, Ōta Kazuyoshi (one of the ikusa metsuke
of Japanese army) instructed the Japanese commanders to return to the
southern coasts of Korea in order to recuperate and wait for the winter
to pass. He also announced that the offensive should resume in the
coming spring (April 1598), where a well-rested Japanese army would
march straight to Hanseong. However, the Japanese did not expect a Ming
counteroffensive to come so early, before they were able to fully settle
down, much less preparing for the 1598 spring offensive. Although Ulsan
Fortress ultimately prevailed against Ming attack, it suffered severe
damage in the process, losing most of its facilities, stored food, war
materials, garrison troops, and more importantly, its function as a
forward base to support the offensive. Furthermore, the threat of
another Ming attack still loomed over the heads of Japanese commanders.
Fearing for the safety of their own fortresses, many Japanese commanders
in Korea petitioned Hideyoshi to abandon Ulsan and Suncheon Fortress in
order to narrow down the battlefront to a more manageable size, of
which Hideyoshi angrily declined. Not one to give up easily,
Japanese commanders petitioned Hideyoshi for the second time, this time
adding Yangsan Fortress into the list of fortresses to be
abandoned. Hideyoshi was understandably furious and harshly
criticised the cowardice of Japanese commanders, but even he realised
that the situation was untenable and eventually ordered the abandonment
of Yangsan Fortress and Gupo, and later pulled out one-half of Japanese
invasion force from Korea.
By this point, no one on the Japanese side was thinking about the 1598
spring offensive anymore. In fact, it was not until April 4, 1598 that
Hideyoshi brought up the resumption of the offensive again. In a
letter addressed to Tachibana Muneshige (立花宗茂), Hideyoshi
mentioned that he wanted to sent another army to Korea in 1599 to resume
the offensive, and ordered Japanese commanders in Korea to procure food,
gunpowder, and other war materials to support the operation. Another
letter written by Fukuhara Nagataka (福原長堯) et al.
to Shimazu Yoshihiro in June 29, 1598 reaffirmed the plan, and
named Fukushima Masanori (福島正則), Mashita Nagamori (増田長盛), and
Ishida Mitsunari (石田三成) as the commanders that would lead the 1599
offensive. Additionally, Ulsan was selected as the landing point for the
new invasion force.
Essentially, Japanese army's entire strategic plan for the second
invasion was derailed. Not only the planned 1598 spring offensive was
completely ruined, forcing Hideyoshi to delay the invasion for another
year, Japanese army was forced into defensive by an enemy one-third its
size (only 40,000 Ming troops had entered Korea at this point, while
Japanese troops in Korea numbered about 140,000), losing all the
initiative and momentum it built since the beginning of the second
invasion.
In July 1598, due to deteriorating health, Hideyoshi ordered Katō
Kiyomasa to restart the peace talk, only this time he dropped everything
in his list of demands (including the cession of Korean provinces,
sending a Joseon prince to Japan as hostage, yearly tribute, and
submission of Joseon Kingdom to Japan) and only asked for one thing: an
apology from the Koreans. Whether that apology was made by Joseon King
or some unnamed nobody mattered not to Hideyoshi, as long as he received
one, he would end the war. After spending seven years waging a fruitless
war, throwing away tens of thousands of lives as well as untold amount
of wealth in the process, Hideyoshi was now eager to end it. The demand
for apology was no more than a face-saving gesture to satisfy his ego,
as well as a last-ditch attempt to hold onto some kind of moral high
ground.
Thus it's fair to say that Siege of Ulsan was the single most important
battle of the second invasion, as well as its real turning point. Even
though Ming army retreated without accomplishing its objective, the
actions of Japanese commanders in Korea as well as Hideyoshi himself
after the siege campaign clearly show that they were rapidly losing
control of the situation. Moreover, all this while Ming army was able to
build up its strength in Korea unhindered, and by September 1598 as many
as 74,400 Ming troops and 24,000 horses had gathered in Korea. From then
on, Ming-Joseon coalition went from being constantly on the defensive
during the early phase of the second invasion to having secured defence
and capable of going on the offensive. In contrast, Japanese army was
forced from a dominant position in full control of the war into a
vulnerable position constantly preoccupied with reacting and responding
to the changing situation. All of these were directly or indirectly
caused by Siege of Ulsan.
Missed opportunity
It should be noted that neither the Chinese nor the Koreans were fully
aware of the instability and chaos on the Japanese side. Due to the
massive debacle that was the previous peace talk, which resulted in the
execution of chief negotiator Shen Wei Jing (沈惟敬), no one in the Ming
army dared to even entertain the idea of re-enter negotiation with the
Japanese anymore. As a result, Ming army continued to amass troops and
gather supply in Korea while purposely ignoring repeated attempts
from Katō Kiyomasa and Konishi Yukinaga to make peace.
Unfortunately, just when Ming army completed the mustering of troops and
Yang Hao was about to put his plan of a new offensive into motion, a
memorial to the throne
written by Ding Ying Tai (丁應泰) in July 1598 sparked a massive
internal feud in both the Ming court and the Ming army in Korea, to the
point that even Joseon court was dragged into the chaos. Ming army was
paralysed by the scandal, wasting away three whole months (July to
October) doing literally nothing. By the time the dust began to settle,
Yang Hao was already discharged in disgrace, Ding Ying Tai ascended to
power and began to lord over the rest of the Ming military leadership in
Korea, and Ming army was heavily disheartened and beset with confusions
and internal strives. As a result, it severely underperformed in the
three sieges that followed. For example, there was little to no
coordination between Ming army led by Liu Ting (劉鋌) and Ming navy led
by Chen Lin (陳璘) during
Siege of Suncheon (Liu Ting barely had any motivation to fight), whereas a
gunpowder accident during
Siege of Sacheon resulted in the most humiliating Ming defeat of Imjin War. The most
egregious one, however, was none other than
Second Siege of Ulsan. The second siege failed not because of any mistake on Ming army's
part, but because Ding Ying Tai forcibly ordered Ma Gui to cancel the
siege and return to Gyeongju "for inspection". In stark contrast, thanks
to the internal strife that paralysed Ming army, Japanese army managed
to weather through its worst period of instability and weakness, and
began to slowly regain footing. By the time a demoralised Ming army
relaunched its offensive in October 1598, Japanese army had sufficiently
stabilised and fought off the three sieges with remarkable competency.
In fact, the whole offensive could've ended up as a massive blunder if
not for
Battle of Noryang, of which the Ming-led coalition navy inflicted the single heaviest
casualties to Japanese navy since the beginning of Imjin War, thus
preserving the reputation of Ming military somewhat.
To summarise, Siege of Ulsan decisively tipped the balance of war in
favour of Ming-Joseon coalition, forever preventing the Japanese from
ever achieving their objectives. However, both Ming court and Ming army
were soon caught up in a massive internal feud, not only wasting away a
golden opportunity to take advantage of the favourable situation, but
also dragging out the war unnecessarily. Regrettably, despite committing
an ever-increasing number of troops and resources into the war, in the
end Ming army still fell short of achieving a complete victory.
Attributions and Special Thanks
While originally I planned to write this blog post based on my original
research, I quickly came to realise that neither my knowledge on this
topic, nor access to historical documents, nor my ability to understand
and interpret those documents to construct a comprehensive narrative are
up to the task. As such, the completion of this article would not be
possible without massive amount of inputs and guidance from
Mi Zhou Zhai
(米粥斋), an expert in the field, through an intermediate (who wishes
to remain anonymous). I also borrowed heavily from
《万历朝鲜战争全史》written by
Zhu Er Dan (朱尔旦), who also penned the
three-part
critique of Samuel Hawley's book
that I translated. For that, I owe them my utmost gratitude.
