Elite Unit of the Ming Dynasty — Biao Bing (標兵)

Armoured Ming cavalrymen, cropped from 'Ping Fan De Sheng Tu (平番得勝圖)'.

While Jia Ding (家丁) was perhaps the most famous Ming Dynasty elite unit, it was not the only one, nor were these semi-private soldiers the most numerous. In actuality, soldiers known as Biao Bing (標兵), an abbreviation of Biao Xia Zhi Bing (標下之兵, lit. 'Soldier under a marked banner'), vastly outnumbered the Jia Ding, and were the closest thing the Ming Dynasty had to a formal elite military formation.

Similar to Jia Ding, Biao Bing also had its root in the long-time practice of high-ranking commanders maintaining their own personal retinues, although it was primarily influenced by, and remained a part of, the Ying Bing System (營兵制). Biao Bing were soldiers that directly and exclusively answered to military overseers (and later Regional Commanders), which, given their high ranks, meant that Biao Bing were drawn from and maintained as the best and most elite soldiers.

Unlike Jia Ding, the founding of a Biao Bing regiment was subject to approval by the central government, and Biao Bing were answerable to the military overseer's position, rather than to the individual. Thus if a military overseer was transferred to another post, he did not take the Biao Bing with him; instead the soldiers answered to his replacement. For this reason, commanders that maintained their own Jia Ding generally avoided assigning their own Jia Ding into Biao Bing regiments.

The earliest Biao Bing regiments, respectively under the command of Supreme Commander of Military Affairs and Concurrently Director-general of Supplies in Xuanda and Shanxi (宣大總督) Weng Wan Da (翁萬達) and Supreme Commander of Military Affairs in the Three Frontiers of Shaanxi (三邊總督) Zeng Xian (曾銑), were founded in 1546, both as a response to the increasingly dire threat possessed by the dreaded Altan Khan necessitating military built-up and increase of battle-readiness along the Ming frontiers. After the establishment of Supreme Commander-led Biao Bing, various Grand Coordinators also followed suit, and later even Regional Commanders begun to raise their own Biao Bing regiments.

As the practice grew widespread, Biao Bing went from being an elite core to the backbone of the Ming army, prompting the need to distinguish various types of Biao Bing: regiments serving under Supreme Commanders or Overseers of the Armed Force were known as Du Biao Ying (督標營, "Overseer-marked regiment"), those led by Grand Coordinators were known as Xun Biao Ying (巡標營, . 'Coordinator-marked regiment"), while Biao Bing commanded by Regional Commanders were organised into Zhen Biao Ying (鎮標營, "Regional-marked regiment").

Recruitment

There were no standardised, codified criteria for recruiting Biao Bing, and they were recruited from a wide variety of sources—often with members of the same unit hailing from markedly different origins. Common sources included:

1. Exceptional soldiers handpicked from existing regiments

Because Biao Bing often served the highest-ranking military overseers of a given theatre—who naturally wanted the very best soldiers under their command—a common method of quickly raising a new Biao Bing regiment was to simply cream the best soldiers and leaders from existing units.

Occasionally, some Regional Commanders—who lacked the authority of military overseers—converted entire Zheng Bing Ying (正兵營) under their command into Biao Bing regiments.

2. Direct recruitment

Given that Biao Bing were more numerous than Jia Ding and organised as full regiments, continually skimming the best soldiers from existing units to raise yet more Biao Bing regiments quickly became impractical and self-defeating—especially once the practice became more common. As such, raising Biao Bing regiments from new recruits remained the preferred method.

3. Tong Shi (通事, lit. 'Translator/interpreter') and Ye Bu Shou (夜不收)

Specialist units such as Tong Shi and Ye Bu Shou were especially valued for their hardiness and their familiarity with local geography, customs, and cultures, making them excellent candidates for Biao Bing recruitment. However, their scarcity meant that Tong Shi and Ye Bu Shou could only supplement the Biao Bing, never constituting the bulk of the regiments’ numbers.

4. Jia Ding

Already elite-trained, Jia Ding naturally made excellent Biao Bing candidates, so attempts were made to recruit them as far back as the earliest conception of Biao Bing. This often came in the form of assigning disgraced commanders along with their Jia Ding into Biao Bing units. Nevertheless, due to conflicting loyalties and the fact that Jia Ding often refused to leave their liege's side for long, these attempts were met with varying success.

Equipment, organisation and tactics

Because Biao Bing were functionally the elite version of normal Ying Bing units, they were organized no differently from ordinary regiments. There was no limitation on arm of service, equipment, or origin of recruits, and no requirement that all members of the same Biao Bing regiment had to belong to the same troop type. They simply received better-quality training, superior equipment, higher status, and improved pay than their ordinary counterparts. Naturally, Biao Bing were more or less indistinguishable from regular Ming soldiers in appearance; only their chain of command sets them apart. 

Many powerful and famous military units in the history of the Ming Dynasty were in fact Biao Bing that exclusively answered to certain military overseers. Notable examples included the war cart regiment of Zeng Xian (曾銑) and the Biao Bing army of Sun Chuan Ting (孫傳庭) during the final years of the Ming Dynasty.

The Regiment's Finest

The Biao Bing served two primary functions, namely to act as an elite vanguard, as well as serving as exemplars to other soldiers. These functions often encompassed serving as military overseer's retinues and bodyguards, fighting in the thick of battle where enemy resistance was fiercest, demonstrating the highest standards of courage and discipline and leading by example, as well as reinforcing military overseer's authority and dominance in order to prevent and suppress potential insubordination and mutiny.

And Biao Bing's battlefield performance certainly lived up to to the elite quality demanded of soldiers entrusted with such functions. Soon after Biao Bing's inception, a contingent of roughly one hundred Biao Bing, who served under Wen Wang Da and were stationed at Bogegu (鵓鴿峪, lit. 'Rock dove valley'), came under attack by tens of thousands of Mongol cavalry . Outnumbered a hundred to one and losing one of their commanders early, these Biao Bing nevertheless fought a valiant last stand, killing nearly six times their own numbers before being overrun. Victory though it was, the Mongols were so shaken by the horrific casualties that they vented their anger by ripping open the bellies of all fallen Biao Bing and stuffing them with rocks—yet the reputation of these fearsome soldiers would still send shockwaves across the entire steppe.

The last stand at Bogegu was certainly not an isolated incident, and Biao Bing would continue to steadfastly serve as the backbone of the Ming military—sometimes even constituting the majority—until the dynasty’s downfall. In fact, even after Ming Dynasty fell into terminal decline, Biao Bing still retained much of their combat prowess. The Biao Bing of Sun Chuan Ting, for example, were instrumental in crushing the Shaanxi peasant rebellion and capturing rebel leader Gao Ying Xian (高迎祥) alive in a brilliantly executed ambush.  

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Military systems and hierarchies of the Ming Dynasty — Part 2: Ying Bing System

Note: English translation of the titles are taken from Chinese-English Dictionary of Ming Government Official Titles, Third Edition, supplemented with some translations of my own.

Note that my own translations and translations taken from elsewhere are italicised.

As the Ming Dynasty began to decline in the sixteenth century, the Wei-Suo System also became increasingly dysfunctional. Corruption, land consolidation, and ever-increasing varieties of corvee labours placed a heavy burden on Wei-Suo servicemen, leading to rampant desertions among able-bodied servicemen, while those who remained were often too old or too weak to desert, and likewise unable to perform military duties. The ailing Wei-Suo System necessitated a reform to salvage the military preparedness of the Ming army, thus a new system known as Ying Bing System (營兵制) was introduced, so-named because soldiers were now organised into regiments known as Ying (營, lit. 'Camp, battalion') instead of Guards and Garrisons.

At its core, Ying Bing System was devised to better manage Mu Bing (募兵, lit. 'Recruited soldier')—a new type of hired soldiery that were recruited and paid a salary for the duration of a military campaign—on a more permanent basis. However, it'd be a reductive misinterpretation to view Ying Bing as some sort of mercenaries, and that the new Ying Bing System superseded the old Wei-Suo System.

In actuality, the bulk of Ying Bing regiments actually comprised of military household servicemen, and both systems ran in parallel and supplemented each others till the very end of the Ming Dynasty. Essentially, Ying Bing System took over the operational functions of the military, allowing Wei-Suo System to be shifted to a primarily administrative role. Under this new system, able-bodied servicemen were drawn from Guards and Garrisons and reorganised into battle-ready regiments, with any vacancies filled by civilian recruits and other sources. This also led to an interesting and unique phenomenon where hereditary military household servicemen, often referred to as Jun (軍, lit. 'Military', i.e. serviceman), and regimented soldiers, often referred to as Bing (兵, lit. 'Soldier'), were seen as two distinct but strongly overlapping entities during Ming period.

Nevertheless, since the Ying Bing System was introduced rather haphazardly as an ad hoc workaround for the ailing Wei-Suo System, and its initial implementation was immature and far from seamless, the system underwent continuous tweaking and refinement until the end of the Ming Dynasty, making it challenging to generalise.

As an institutionalised field formation, leadership positions of the Ying Bing System were directly dispatched and appointed by the central government, and denoted roles rather than formal titles. As such, none of the positions had either a rank or a salary, and it was not unusual for one person to assume several positions concurrently. In addition, there were also numerous one-off titles created for specific purposes.

1. Military Overseers

A unique aspect of the Ying Bing System was that its highest command echelon was dominated not by military officials but by civil officials, who assumed the role of military overseers. Initially, military overseers managed the strategic planning and administrative aspects of the military; however, some were soon granted authority to command military forces, even though planning and administration remained their primary responsibilities.

Military overseers with command authority recruited their soldiers independently of standard regiments, which were directly subordinate to them. These regiments, known as Biao Bing Ying (標兵營), were often made up of the cream of the crop of soldiers, trained to a comparable standard to Jia Ding (家丁).

Du Shi (督師)/Overseer of the Armed Force

Belatedly established during the final years of the Ming Dynasty, Overseer of the Armed Force was the highest-ranking military officer of the Ming Dynasty's military, and was granted the authority to command all military assets in a given theatre, usually four to seven Sheng (省), or provinces.

Overseer of the Armed Force was not a permanent position and could be appointed and dismissed on an as-needed basis, which, given the position's extensive geographical jurisdiction, usually meant the empire was facing a major crisis.

Jing Lue (經略)/Military Affairs Commissioner

A Military Affairs Commissioner was a high-ranking military overseer primarily tasked with coordinating military operations involving either the Japanese or the Jurchens/Manchu, and was granted authority to command Grand Coordinators and Regional Commanders involved in a given military campaign. Military Affairs Commissioner slightly outranked Supreme Commander, the next-highest position, although it lacked the authority to issue direct orders to Supreme Commander. On the occasions when both Military Affairs Commissioner and Supreme Commander were present in the same military campaign, decisions were made through discussion and collective agreement between the two.

Similar to Overseer of the Armed Force, Military Affairs Commissioner was not a permanent position and could be appointed and dismissed on an as-needed basis. By and large, this position was only needed when there was a wartime emergency or important military campaign.

Zong Du (總督)/Supreme Commander

A Supreme Commander was a senior military overseer with the authority to coordinate and command Grand Coordinators and Regional Commanders from two to three adjacent provinces, defence regions, or a combination of the two.

For the most part, Supreme Commander was also not a permanent position and could be appointed or dismissed on an as-needed basis, although there were some notable exceptions such as Supreme Commander of Liangguang (兩廣總督), Supreme Commander of Military Affairs in the Three Frontiers of Shaanxi (三邊總督) and a few others, which were functionally permanent posts.

Xun Fu (巡撫)/Grand Coordinator

A Grand Coordinator was a official tasked with overseeing the Provincial Administration Commission (布政司), Provincial Surveillance Commission (按察司), and Regional Military Commission of a designated area, usually but not always a province, thus making him functionally the highest-ranking governing official of that area. Unlike the Overseer of the Armed Force, Military Affairs Commissioner, and Supreme Commander, Grand Coordinator was not a strictly military position, although its responsibility and authority could be, and often was, further expanded to encompass military roles within its province, ranging from administrative and advisory positions to full authority to command Military Superintendents and Regional Commanders.

Originally an imperial auditor dispatched by the emperor to evaluate and, if necessary, intervene in the operations of provincial governments, the Grand Coordinator was made a permanent post with its own government office during mid-Ming period, as it was found to be effective in enabling the central government to exert direct control over its provinces.

Circuit official

A Dao (道), or circuit, was a supervising institution established by the provincial governments to oversee and monitor the operations of prefecture-level governments, although over time it also gradually assumed governing and administrative responsibilities. Many types of circuits existed, often with confusingly overlapping roles and responsibilities. However, by far the most common were Fen Shou Dao (分守道), or the General Administration Circuit, primarily responsible for administration, finance and taxation; and Fen Xun Dao (分巡道), or the General Surveillance Circuit, primarily responsible for law enforcement, public order, and governance oversight.

Regarding military matters, the circuit primarily responsible was Bing Bei Dao (兵備道), or the Military Defence Circuit, although it sometimes shared this role with General Administration Circuit and General Surveillance Circuit. Military Defence Circuit was charged with training Wei-Suo servicemen and militia, manufacturing and maintaining weapons and equipment, building and maintaining fortifications and city walls, managing logistics, soldier's pay, and military household farmlands, law enforcement and public safety, river and coastal patrols, fostering smoother cooperation between Wei-Suo System and Ying Bing System, and many more. During wartime, circuit officials served in a similar role as Grand Coordinator but in a lesser capacity, reporting to the former and assisting field commanders of lower ranks such as Vice Regional Commanders and Assistant Regional Commanders.

Less commonly, Xun Hai Dao (巡海道), or the Coastal Patrol Circuit, which was more specialised in coastal patrols, combating piracy, and regulating maritime trade, would also be involved in military affairs, especially against naval threats.

Military-related circuits also served an important secondary function—that is, serving in these circuits allowed low-ranking civil officials to accustom themselves to military matters early in their careers. This ensured that a cadre of military-trained civil officials was always available to serve, thereby reducing the likelihood of unqualified officials with no practical military experience being abruptly promoted into senior military roles.

2. Field Commanders

In contrast to military overseers, the role of field commanders was exclusively held by military officials. Their primary duty was to lead battlefield operations, with secondary responsibilities including overseeing training, maintaining fortifications, and even managing canal dredging.

Ti Du (提督)/Military Superintendent

A Military Superintendent was a commanding officer who was granted additional authority over military assets beyond his designated area of responsibility. Typically, this referred to a Regional Commander or Vice Regional Commander who also commanded a few Garrisons in an adjacent province (because a country's defence disposition does not always align with its administrative division), in such cases his original title took precedence as his primary responsibility outweighed his secondary one. However, for major military campaigns, a Regional Commander who was granted the title of Military Superintendent could even command other Regional Commanders subordinated to him, and in such cases he would adopt the title of Military Superintendent as his new primary title, although only for the duration of that campaign.

Elsewise, a Grand Coordinator who was granted full military authority over a province would also receive the same title (the title of Grand Coordinator still took precedence).

Zong Bing (總兵)/Regional Commander

A Regional Commander was a commanding officer with operational authority over a designated area, either a province or a Zhen (鎮), or defence region. Barring the provisional Military Superintendent, it was the highest attainable position for a military official.

The full title of a Regional Commander was actually Zhen Shou Zong Bing Guan (鎮守總兵官, lit. 'Region-defending commander'), with the prefix of Zhen Shou (鎮守, lit. 'Regional defence') indicating that he was responsible for the defence of the entire province or defence region. Naturally, a Regional Commander and the regiments under his command would be stationed at a fortress-settlement called Zhen Cheng (鎮城, lit. '[Defence] Region-city'), which also served as the military headquarters of the entire defence region.

A regiment under direct command of a Regional Commander was known as a Zheng Bing Ying (正兵營, lit. 'Orthodox soldier regiment'). However, after the practice of raising Biao Bing Ying became widespread, Regional Commanders also gradually switched to raising their own Biao Bing Ying.

Fu Zong Bing (副總兵)/Vice Regional Commander

A Vice Regional Commander, as the title suggests, was the second-in-command to the Regional Commander. The position came in two main types, one with the prefix Xie Shou (協守, lit. 'Assisting defence'), who was stationed together with and assisted the Regional Commander; the other with the prefix Fen Shou (分守, lit. 'Separate defence'), who guarded a sub-region within a defence region, called Lu (路), or route. Usually, a Sub-regional Vice Commander and the regiments under his command would be stationed at a smaller fortress-settlement called Lu Cheng (路城, lit. 'Route-city').

A regiment under direct command of a Vice Regional Commander was known as a Qi Bing Ying (奇兵營, lit. 'Unorthodox soldier regiment'). True to its namesake, Qi Bing Ying often engaged in unorthodox tactics such as ambush and flanking attack, and was considered the most elite among the standard regiments.

Can Jiang (參將)/Assistant Regional Commander

An Assistant Regional Commander was a commanding officer ranked below Vice Regional Commander, who advised and assisted the Regional Commander. Like Vice Regional Commander, it also came in Xie Shou and Fen Shou variety, although the majority were Sub-regional Assistant Commanders (i.e. Fen Shou prefix) that guarded either a single route or a strategic choke point (such as a major gateway of the Great Wall). An Assistant Regional Commander outranked a Mobile Corps Commander but did not have the authority to issue direct orders to the latter, as both answered only to Regional Commander.

A regiment under direct command of an Assistant Regional Commander was known as a Yuan Bing Ying (援兵營, lit. 'Succoring soldier regiment'), which focused on safeguarding its designated route, as well as supporting, reinforcing, and acting in concert with other regiments during a larger military campaign.

You Ji (游擊)/Mobile Corps Commander

A Mobile Corps Commander was a commanding officer who had no designated area of responsibility, and could be deployed anywhere within the defence region as the Regional Commander deemed fit. He also had limited authority to engage the enemy or reinforce other commanders at his discretion, without awaiting orders from higher command.

A regiment under direct command of a Mobile Corps Commander was known as a You Bing Ying (游兵營, lit. 'Roaming soldier regiment'), which functioned as a rapid response force.

Du Si (都司)/Supervising Commander

Originally a short form of Regional Military Commission, Du Si or Supervising Commander had since become a title of a military officer during mid-to-late Ming period, primarily responsible for leading and managing Zhong Jun (中軍, lit. 'Army of the Centre'), the headquarters unit of a regiment. Occasionally, Supervising Commander also served as either acting Assistant Regional Commander or acting Mobile Corps Commander.

Supervising Commander outranked Municipal Military Commander, despite the title being introduced later. It did not have the authority to issue direct orders to Municipal Military Commander.

Shou Bei (守備)/Municipal Military Commander

A Municipal Military Commander was a commanding officer who was responsible for the defence of a single settlement or fortress, and was usually stationed at a Wei Cheng, a Suo Cheng (i.e. existing Wei-Suo System fortress-settlements), or an even smaller fortress-settlement called Bao Cheng (堡城, lit. 'Fort-town'). Most Municipal Military Commanders were subordinate to an Assistant Regional Commander, although there were some that answered directly to the Regional Commander, or even Supreme Commander.

Soldiers under the command of Municipal Military Commanders were known as Shou Cheng Bing (守城兵, lit. 'City-defending soldier'), who were often drawn from Cheng Chao Jun (城操軍, lit. 'City-defending and drilling serviceman')— that is, Wei-Suo servicemen selected for city defence duty and underwent regular training, blurring the line between the two. Shou Cheng Bing were considered the lowest quality soldiers and rarely form regiments, although they still met minimum combat-capable standards. In time of need, Shou Cheng Bing also acted as a reservist force and provided replacement personnel for other regiments.

3. Junior Military Officers

Junior military officers were grassroots-level officers that assisted field commanders in various operational duties. They were appointed by the local Grand Coordinators or (rarely) Supreme Commanders, rather than the central government, and thus were not generally considered Jiang Guang (將官, lit. 'General-official') or "commander", although this wasn't a hard rule (Municipal Military Commander for example could be appointed by a Supreme Commander).

Since local Grand Coordinators or Supreme Commanders appointed their respective junior military officers, there was little standardization in their titles and responsibilities. Nevertheless, junior military officers could still be broadly grouped into two categories, namely Guang Ying Guan (管營官) and Shou Tu Guan (守土官), which will be elaborated below.

3.1 Guan Ying Guan (管營官)/Regiment-managing Officers

Regiment-managing Officers were junior military officers subordinate to their respective Regiment Commanders, responsible for leading small units, executing command orders, managing troop training and so on. Nevertheless, it should be noted that there was little standardisation at the regimental level, as different commanders organised and structured their respective regiments differently. There were also clear differences between regiments raised in North China and regiments raised in South China.

For example, unit hierarchy of the Qi Jia Jun (戚家軍) was as follow:

• Wu (伍, five personnel) — Dui (隊, 12 personnel) — Shao (哨, 49 personnel) — Guan (官, 297 personnel) — Zong (總, roughly 940 personnel) — Da Ying (大營, roughly 4,000 personnel)

For comparison, Ji Defence Region Infantry Regiment led by the same commander was organised as follow:

• Wu (伍, five personnel) — Dui (隊, 12 personnel) — Qi (旗, 37 personnel) — Ju (局, 112 personnel) — Si (司, 449 personnel) — Bu (部, 889 personnel) — Ying (營, 2,699 personnel)

This shows that there could be considerable variations between regiments, even those led by the same commander at different times. As such, the following list of Regiment-managing Officers only represented the most generic structure of a North China defence region regiment.

Ying Jiang (營將)/Regiment Commander

A Regiment Commander, as its name suggests, was a commanding officer appointed to lead a single regiment on behalf of a higher-ranked commander who had multiple regiments under his command, and thus could not personally lead each one. Usually, Regiment Commanders led Biao Bing Ying on behalf of military overseers, who generally lacked combat training.

(Note: Regiment Commander was not a junior military officer)

Zhong Jun Guan (中軍官)/Officer of the Army of the Centre

An Officer of the Army of the Centre was one of the positions that a Supervising Commander could hold, with the primary responsibilities of relaying orders from the commander to the rest of the regiment.

Zuo Ying Guan (坐營官)/Military Official on-duty

A Military Official on-duty was another position that a Supervising Commander could hold, the primary responsibilities of which were to manage and lead the regiment. Oftentimes, Officer of the Army of the Centre and Military Official on-duty were merged into one position, called Zuo Ying Zhong Jun Guan (坐營中軍官), and held by a single officer.

Qian Zong (千總)/Battalion Officer

A Battalion Officer typically commanded a military unit of two companies, totalling one thousand soldiers, called a Shao (哨, lit. 'Sentry'), or Battalion.

Ba Zong (把總)/Company Officer

A Company Officer typically commanded a military unit of ten platoons, totalling five hundred soldiers, called a Si (司, lit. 'Bureau') or Company.

Guan Dui (管隊)/Platoon Officer

A Platoon Officer typically commanded a military unit of ten teams, totalling fifty soldiers, called a Dui (隊) or Platoon. Sometimes a single platoon could have up to two Platoon Officers.

Wu Zhang (伍長)/Team Leader

A Team Leader commanded a small military unit of five soldiers, called a Wu (伍), or Team.

Other than troop leaders, there were also many specialist officers, including but not limited to:

• Qi Gu Guan (旗鼓官, lit. 'Banner and drum officer'), an officer who managed the relaying of orders with flag and drum signals;
• Qi Pai Guan (旗牌官, lit. 'Banner and badge officer'), an officer who managed communication with runners;
• Tang Bao Guan (塘報官, lit. 'Scout officer'), a scout officer;
• Shen Qi Ba Zong (神器把總, lit. 'Divine tool officer'), and officer who managed the firearms division and attached artillery.

3.2 Shou Tu Guan (守土官)/Territory-defending Officers

Territory-defending Officers were junior military officers subordinate to Municipal Military Commanders, and were tasked with defending various forts, fortlets, watch towers, and villages. They came in all sort of titles with little to no standardisation, including but not limited to:

• Cao Shou (操守, Military Officer in Charge of Training and Defense Affairs)
• Bei Yu (備禦, lit. 'Warder')
• Ti Diao (提調, lit. 'Promoter')
• Fang Shou Guan (防守官, lit. 'Defence officer')
• Qian Zong (千總) and Ba Zong (把總), sharing the same titles with Battalion Officer and Company Officer respectively, but with very different duties.

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Ying Chuan (鷹船)

Note: This blog post was originally part of my Sha Chuan (沙船) article. However, after updating that article with additional information, I decided to separate this content into its own article.

Drawing of a Ying Chuan, from 'Wu Bei Zhi (《武備志》)'.

The Ying Chuan (鹰船, lit. 'Eagle ship') was an unusual riverine warship that emerged from the shipyards around the estuary of the Yangtze River. Converted from a type of civilian ship known as Shuang Ta Chuan (雙塔船, lit. 'Double tower ship', Shuang Ta was the old name of Shangtazhen), differing in that Shuang Ta Chuan used yuloh whereas Ying Chuan used oars, it rose to prominence during Jia Jing Da Wo Kou (嘉靖大倭寇) period due to its utility in defending inland waterways against Wokou vessels that slipped pass larger naval warships like Fu Chuan (福船), with its use quickly spreading to Guangdong, Fujian and Zhejiang

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Feng Zhou Zhan Jian (封舟戰艦) — The Ming ironclad

Illustration of a Qing period Feng Zhou, from 'Zhong Shan Chuan Xin Lu (《中山傳信錄》)'. It should be noted that Ming period Feng Zhou, above all the ironclad warship, likely looked very different from this illustration.

The so-called Feng Zhou Zhan Jian was a type of large warship built in 1568~1569 to counter the Wu Wei Chuan (烏尾船) of notorious Chinese pirate lord Zeng Yi Ben (曾一本) (Note: article available to my Supporter-tier patrons only), who had long terrorised the coasts of Guangdong Province and had outright defeated Ming navy on several occasions. 

Though unique in its kind, this formidable warships actually did not have a proper name to call its own, as it was simply referred to as "giant warship" in historical sources. It was only dubbed 'Feng Zhou Zhan Jian (封舟戰艦, lit. 'Investiture war ship') in popular discourse out of convenience, due to the fact that the warship was specifically constructed to the same size and/or quality standard as Feng Zhou (封舟, lit. 'Investiture ship'), ocean-going sailing ship specifically built for Imperial Chinese investiture missions to Ryukyu Kingdom. Despite the misleading moniker, Feng Zhou Zhan Jian was purpose-built from the ground up for war, rather than converted from existing investiture ship.

Size and construction

Information about Feng Zhou Zhan Jian's dimensions and design is very incomplete, as no known blueprints or other design documents of the ship exist. From the few descriptions that survived, it's known that Feng Zhou Zhan Jian had a beam of 4 zhang (roughly 12.52 m or 41.08 ft), and it was known to be fitted with masts of 17~18 zhang (roughly 53.21~56.34 m or 174.57~184.84 ft) in height. Thus, it can be inferred with high confidence that a Feng Zhou Zhan Jian was approximately 53~56 m/174~184 ft long with a beam of approximately 12.5 m/41 ft (Chinese junks are generally as long as their mainmasts are tall), which was roughly comparable to HMS Victory, and in line with known sizes of (non-combat) Ryukyu investiture ships of the time.

Since Feng Zhou Zhan Jian was built in Fujian, it most likely took the form of an oversized Fu Chuan (福船), i.e. a sailing war junk with a prominent multi-storey aftercastle, fully enclosed superstructure above its main deck, as well as protective bamboo palisade around the deck and the roof of the superstructure. Likewise, it was most likely built from Chinese fir, pine and camphor wood like its lesser cousins. At least some Feng Zhou Zhan Jian had two-layered bottom planking, in keeping with the standard practice of building Ryukyu investiture ship.

The masts of Feng Zhou Zhan Jian were constructed from joining together multiple pieces of timbers and reinforcing them with iron hoops, in part due to difficulties in sourcing enough tree logs of sufficient length for such a large ship. For sails, Feng Zhou Zhan Jian employed junk sailing rig with sails made of bamboo mat backed by thick sailcloth, which were quite different from rolled bamboo mat sails used by most other Fujian warships at the time. 

Perhaps the most interesting feature of Feng Zhou Zhan Jian was the iron reinforcement around its hull, which consisted of more than forty large iron bands running vertically from the keel to the gunwales, forming an external iron skeletal frame. This feature was already present on some Ryukyu investiture ships to improve hull integrity during long voyage, although for warship the amount of iron bands more than doubled (normal investiture ship only had twenty iron bands) as they now served as armour against ramming as well—a necessary precaution against Guang Chuan (廣船) built with significantly sturdier woods than ships built in Fujian.

Armaments

While Feng Zhou Zhan Jian was noted to be heavily stocked up with firearms in period sources, all but a handful of its armaments remain unknowable due to incomplete records. Only three weapons were confirmed to be equipped by Feng Zhou Zhan Jian, namely wooden Fa Gong (發熕), Pai Gan (拍竿), as well as Zhuang Liang (撞樑) for lateral ramming. However, based on inference from historical documents about war preparation against Zeng Yi Ben, it's almost certain that Feng Zhou Zhan Jian was also equipped with normal (i.e. metal) Fa Gong, Fo Lang Ji (佛郎機) and Bai Zi Chong (百子銃), iron-cased Peng Tong (噴筒) and rockets, as well as an assortment of handheld naval weapons for its crews including matchlock guns, grenades, javelins, bows and arrows, swords and shields, as well as spears.

On top of that, based on better-preserved records about diplomatic missions to Ryukyu, it is known that a contemporary Ryukyu investiture ship would be armed with 20 Fo Lang Ji, 10 Wan Kou Chong (碗口銃), 60 Xiu Chong (袖銃, lit. 'Sleeve gun'), 100 arquebuses, 1,000 javelins, 60 spears, 300 sabres, 100 rattan shields, 100 iron helmets, and 100 iron armours. It can be safely presumed that Feng Zhou Zhan Jian would be at least armed to a comparable standard as its diplomatic counterpart, if not better.

Given the time period and possible armaments of Feng Zhou Zhan Jian, it is clear that the warship wasn't designed with Age of Sail-style artillery broadside or line-of-battle tactic in mind. Instead, Feng Zhou Zhan Jian likely fought with more traditional tactics, namely using its considerable anti-personnel firepower to kill and suppress enemy ship crews, flamethrowers and rockets to set fire to enemy rigging, as well as ramming and boarding. While it did carry heavier Fa Gong, probably mounted as chase gun, that could inflict damage on enemy vessel directly, such role was generally given to smaller and more agile oared vessels in the Ming navy.

 

Crew

Feng Zhou Zhan Jian had a crew of 224, which consisted of a Bu Dao (捕盜, lit. 'Thief-catcher', this was the name for a warship's captain during Ming period), 3 Duo Shou (舵手, helmsman) and 220 sailors and soldiers. Other crew positions on the ship included Liao Ding Shou (繚椗手, sail and anchor operator), Zhao Dou Shou (招斗手, solider stationed to crow's nest or fighting top), Fa Gong gunner, Fo Lang Ji gunner, arquebusier, rocketeer, Pen Tong operator, shielded javelin thrower, archer and spearman, although regrettably it's unknown how many crews were assigned to each position.

Interestingly, for such a huge warship Feng Zhou Zhan Jian had a relatively small crew contingent.

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Lian Zhu Pao (連珠砲) and Yu Gu Pao (漁皷砲)

Drawing of a Lian Zhu Pao (right) and Yu Gu Pao (left), from 'Wu Bei Ji Yao (《武備集要》)'.

Lian Zhu Pao (連珠砲, lit. 'Rapid bead cannon') and Yu Gu Pao (漁皷砲, lit. 'Fisherman's drum cannon') were two types of lightweight cannons commonly used by Ming border armies of the strategically important San Bian (三邊, lit. 'Three borders') of Shaanxi Province, namely Gansu Defence Region (甘肅鎮), Yansui Defence Region (延綏鎮), Ningxia Defence Region (寧夏鎮), as well as the main headquarters, Guyuan Defence Region (固原鎮).

The two cannons were more or less identical, except for the lack of reinforcing hoops in Yu Gu Pao. Both cannons were around three chi in length, six fen in barrel thickness, and had a bore diameter of around one cun one fen (1.4 in / 35.2 mm). Designed to be carriable by just one person, these cannons could either launch a single one cun diameter lead cannonball at considerable distance using five to six liang of gunpowder, or loaded with additional lead or iron pellets for close range scatter shot.

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Hui Ping (灰瓶) and Yan Guan (煙罐)

Some ceramic containers that could be made into Hui Ping and Yan Guan (highlighted), from 'Wu Bei Ji Yao (《武備集要》)'.

Hui Ping (灰瓶, lit. ‘ash bottle’) and Yan Guan (煙罐, lit. ‘smoke jar’) were two oft-overlooked Ming less-lethal weapons commonly used in siege defence and naval warfare. As their names suggest, Hui Ping was a ceramic bottle filled with quicklime powder, meant to be thrown at enemy soldiers to blind and suffocate them, whereas Yan Guan was a black powder-based ceramic smoke bomb used to create a smoke screen, generate choking smoke, or possibly both.

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Hu Wei Chong (虎尾銃)

Drawing of two Hu Wei Chong mounted on a double-ended stand, from 'Wu Bei Ji Yao (《武備集要》)'.

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Patreon supporter only: Xu Chao Guang (許朝光), Yelang Beyond the Sea

Wokou engaging in rape and pillage, from 'Tai Ping Kang Wo Tu (《太平抗倭圖》)'.

In the previous months I've covered some Jia Jing Da Wo Kou (嘉靖大倭寇) topics, namely Zhang Lian (張璉), who was a mountain bandit being mistaken as Wokou, as well as Twenty-four Generals of Yue Gang (月港), who were a rare case of grassroots attempt to participate in smuggling/piratical activities. For this article though, I will cover another famous pirate lord named Xu Chao Guang (許朝光). In many ways, Xu Chao Guang was a quintessential Wokou, however he only became active during the later phases of Jia Jing Da Wo Kou, when Ming coastal defence began to improve, many notorious Chinese Wokou leaders had been wiped out, and the inflow of Japanese Wokou began to dry out. Thus, his piratical activities showed signs of transitioning from Wokou/Japanese-based piracy practices into Chinese-style piracy.

This article is exclusive to my Supporter-tier Patrons and can be accessed here. If you like my work, please support me via Patreon!

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Battle of Jiksan

This illustration actually depicts Battle of Byeokjegwan rather than Battle of Jiksan, hence the snowy terrain. Unfortunately there is a serious lack of modern illustration of Battle of Jiksan, so I have to make do with what I can find. The particular painting is the handiwork of Feng Zi Jian (冯子建).

Prelude

The complete destruction of Joseon navy during Battle of Chilcheollyang thoroughly upended the defence landscape of Korea. Joseon army, still reeling from the devastation of the previous Japanese invasion, could not offer any meaningful resistance to the renewed Japanese onslaught, and the responsibility of defending Korea thus disproportionately fell on the shoulders of Ming army, of which there were only 12,000 Ming troops scattered around Korea at the time.

Japanese army met its first serious opposition at Namwon, which guards a critical mountain pass connecting Gyeongsang Province and Jeolla Province. Unfortunately, it was impossible for 3,000 Ming troops and 700 Joseon troops in a poorly fortified city to resist a besieging force of 56,800 troops, and Siege of Namwon ended in Japanese victory in just four days.

The fall of Namwon spooked the Ming garrison at Jeonju to immediately abandon the city and retreat to Gongju. From then on, Japanese army met no further challenge and was able to rampage through Jeolla and Chungcheong Province unopposed. The vast majority of Joseon leadership and military garrisons of the two provinces abandoned their duty and fled, and Japanese troops actually spent more time looting, torching villages and rooting out Korean refugees hiding in the mountains to be massacred than fighting (they were far more violent and cruel during the second invasion than the first). As Japanese army steadily drew closer to Hanseong (present-day Seoul), capital city of Joseon Kingdom, Ming armies at Gongju and Chunju were also recalled to Hanseong to bolster its defence. Gongju subsequently fell into Japanese hands.

To prevent Japanese army from marching straight to Hanseong without anyone standing in its way, the Supreme Commander (總督) of Ming army in Korea, Xing Jie (邢玠), who was at Liaodong at the time, issued an order to Military Superintendent (提督) Ma Gui (麻貴), asking him to send Ming army to defend Jiksan and Cheonan City. Upon receiving his order, Ma Gui dispatched Jie Sheng, Po Gui, Yang Deng Shan and Niu Bo Ying to lead 2,000 Ming cavalry (which were all Ming army could spare at the time) and head south to interdict Japanese army. Unfortunately, due to time-delay of relaying messages between Liaodong and Hanseong, Cheonan had already fallen into Japanese hands. As thus, Ming army wasn't able to enter Cheonan as originally planned, and had to set up an ambush between Jiksan and Cheonan.

The Battlefield

Ming army went all the way from Hanseong to Jiksan to interdict Japanese army (click to enlarge).

Battle of Jiksan was a meeting engagement between Ming army and Japanese army that happened at roughly 4 km south of Jiksan.

Belligerents

Ming army

Commander: Jie Sheng (解生), Po Gui (頗貴), Yang Deng Shan (楊登山), Niu Bo Ying (牛伯英)

Total strength: 15 officers, 2,000 cavalry

Casualties: 85 noses collected by Kuroda Nagamasa's army after the battle*, 150~160 claimed dead

*Note: Since Ming army withdrew from battle first, thus allowing Kuroda Nagamasa to clean up the battlefield, 85 dead can be taken as the most accurate assessment of Ming casualties. Nevertheless, Ming army may or may not suffered additional casualties depending on whether it fought Mōri Hidemoto's reinforcement or not.

Japanese army

Kuroda Nagamasa's army

1. Vanguard

Commander: Kuroda Naoyuki (黒田直之), Kuriyama Toshiyasu (栗山利安), Keya Takehisa (毛屋武久)

Strength: Unknown, but in the range of 2,000+

2. Scout

Commander: Gotō Mototsugu (後藤基次), Kuroda Kazushige (黒田一成), Nomura Ichiemon (野村市右衛門)

Strength: Unknown

3. Full army (after reorganisation)

3.1 Centre Battle

Commander: Kuroda Nagamasa (黒田長政)

Strength: 2,000 troops.

3.2 Left Battle

1st Left Division Commander: Gotō Mototsugu (後藤基次), Kuroda Kazushige (黒田一成)

2nd Left Division Commander: Kuroda Naoyuki (黒田直之), Kiriyama Nobuyuki (桐山信行)

Strength: Unknown

3.3 Right Battle

1st Right Division Commander: Mori Tomonobu (母里友信), Kuriyama Toshiyasu (栗山利安), Kuroda Toshitaka (黒田利高)

2nd Right Division Commander: Inoue Kurobei (井上九郎兵衛), Nomura Ichiemon (野村市右衛門)

Strength: Unknown

Total strength: Approximately 5,000 troops

Casualties: 29-31 heads collected by Ming army, 500~600 claimed dead*

*Note: Claim given by Ming troops returning from battle and seemingly corroborated by the testimony of Fukuda Kansuke (福田勘介), a soldier of Mōri Hidemoto's army who was captured by Koreans on a later date. However, a testimony under duress may not be all that reliable.

Mōri Hidemoto's reinforcement

1. Vanguard

Commander: Shishido Mototsugu (宍戶元續)

Strength: 2,950 troops

2. Main army

Commander: Mōri Hidemoto (毛利秀元)

Strength: Unknown

Total strength: Unknown but around 25,000+

Casualties: Unknown but likely negligible

The Battle

On October 17, 1597, the vanguard of Kuroda Nagamasa's army led by Kuroda Naoyuki, Kuriyama Toshiyasu and Keya Takehisa left Cheonan City before dawn and marched north towards Jiksan. At the time, the Japanese didn't know about Ming ambush, although Kuroda Nagamasa's vanguard was able to detect the presence of Ming army before being detected in return.

Mistakenly believing (or more likely, deliberately inflating) that the number of Ming troops to be far greater than they really were, commanders of the vanguard fell into indecision. Kuroda Naoyuki wanted to retreat to rendezvous with Kuroda Nagamasa's main army before deciding the next course of action, however he was objected by Keya Takehisa, who rightly pointed out that it was impossible to outrun Ming cavalry by foot. Keya Takehisa instead suggested that the vanguard should launch a surprise attack against the still-unsuspecting Ming army, then quickly retreat amidst the chaos. He also added that Ming troops were well-protected by bullet-proof iron shields (Note: the claim about iron shields is quite dubious), thus matchlock guns should only be used to signal and cover the charge (with gun smoke), and the battle should be decided in close combat. In the end Keya Takehisa's suggestion was accepted by other commanders.

On the Ming side, Ming troops actually detected Kuroda Nagamasa's vanguard as well, but mistook them for Koreans as Japanese troops of the vanguard were dressed in white. As thus, they did not react to these "Koreans" closing in until they suddenly opened fire. Caught in a surprise, Ming troops were momentarily pushed back, but quickly regained composure as Kuroda Nagamasa's vanguard attempted to disengage from them, and began a fierce counterattack.

Meanwhile, Kuroda Nagamasa, who departed Cheonan later, was alerted by the sounds of gunshots coming from the direction of his vanguard. Hoping that his vanguard was merely using matchlock gun for hunting, Kuroda Nagamasa nevertheless ordered Gotō Mototsugu, Kuroda Kazushige and Nomura Ichiemon to scout ahead due to a sneaking suspicion that the vanguard had run into troubles. The scouts quickly arrived at the scene and saw that Kuroda Nagamasa's suspicion had indeed become reality—Ming cavalry already defeated the vanguard and chased them over an earthen bridge, and both armies entered a stand-off at either side of the bridge.

Gotō Mototsugu, who was the first scout to arrive and saw the carnage, quickly retreated to a nearby hill for safety, and called other scouts to follow suit. However, Kuroda Kazushige insisted to immediately help the vanguard and rushed to join the fray, as he was worried that since the vanguard was surrounded, Ming army could directly go after Kuroda Nagamasa if they failed to prevent a bridge crossing. He personally hopped onto the bridge and slew several Ming troops while directing the vanguard to defend the bridge, and successfully drove Ming army back after a fierce battle. Meanwhile, Gotō Mototsugu ordered his troops to create large movements on the hill to give an impression that a large Japanese army had taken control of the hilltop, in the hope that this will confuse Ming troops and delay them further. Soon after, Kuroda Nagamasa himself also arrived and climbed the hill on the east side of the battlefield to access the situation. He proclaimed that they must prepare to fight to the death as there won't be any more backup coming, then reorganised his army into three battles to engage the Chinese in pitched battle.

After the rearrangement, Mori Tomonobu, commander of the 1st Right Division, re-initiated the fight by ordering his arquebusiers to open fire. He was quickly followed by Kuriyama Toshiyasu and Gotō Mototsugu (commanders of 1st Right Division and 1st Left Division, respectively), who shouted warcries and charged Ming army. Ming troops responded by shooting volleys of arrows into Japanese ranks, then engaged them in close combat. During the chaotic melee Kuroda Kazushige, Kuroda Naoyuki, Mori Tomonobu, Kuriyama Toshiyasu and Gotō Mototsugu found themselves surrounded, although they managed to break out of encirclement with great difficulties. Seeing that his subordinates were in great danger, Kuroda Nagamasa committed his own 2,000 troops and personally joined the fight. He was soon joined by Shishido Mototsugu, who just arrived at the scene leading the vanguard of Mōri Hidemoto's army. Despite this, they still failed to gain upper hand over Ming army. Nevertheless, the situation completely overturned as the battle dragged into noon, as Mōri Hidemoto himself arrived with a large army, bringing the total number of Japanese troops at the scene to around 30,000.

What happened next varies depending on the source. Most Chinese and Korean sources, and some Japanese sources, agree that Ming army bailed as fast as it could at the sight of Mōri Hidemoto's massive reinforcement. However, Mōri Kaki (『毛利家記』, i.e. Mōri Clan Records) claims that Mōri Hidemoto slaughtered many thousands of Ming troops and saved Kuroda Nagamasa from the brink of danger. Survivors of the slaughter fled to a nearby hill and dispatched a translator to Mōri Hidemoto to beg for mercy, which he gracefully granted and let them go. While it is clear that this record is heavily biased and exaggerated (Ming army wasn't large enough to be able to afford the loss of "many thousands" of troops), the possibility that Mōri Hidemoto did briefly fight Ming army, rather than Ming army immediately retreating without engaging him, cannot be completely ruled out.

In any case, and regardless of which source to believe, thus ended Battle of Jiksan.

Aftermath

Ming army quickly retreated to Jinwi after successfully disengaging. Still feeling threatened, it continued to retreat north after a short rest and meal, arriving at Suwon by evening. The news of Ming retreat quickly reached Hanseong, and upon being briefed on the latest situation, Ma Gui immediately mobilised Ming army stationed at Hanseong to guard the river crossings of Han River, knowing full well that Hanseong was at the brink of coming under direct threat. He also worried that Suwon—now the last line of defence between Hanseong and the Japanese—would soon come under attack, so he ordered Bai Sai (摆塞) to lead 2,500 elite cavalry to reinforce other Ming commanders at Suwon and interdict the coming Japanese army.

Route of retreat of the Ming army (click to enlarge).

After Ming army retreated from battle, Japanese army did not give pursuit and returned to Cheonan City for the night. The next day (October 18, 1597), it resumed advance northwards and quickly captured the now vacant Jiksan. From hereon, it appears that Japanese army continued to head north and ran into Ming army again.

The Elusive Battle of Sosapyeong

Ming army engaged Japanese army once again on October 18, 1597 (click to enlarge).

Battle of Sosapyeong was a skirmish between Ming army and Japanese army at Sosapyeong (소사평 or 素沙坪), a flat grassland north of Jiksan.

A relatively unheard of battle, what exactly transpired during Battle of Sosapyeong varies depending on the source. According to Korean source Sangchongo (《상촌고》 or 《象村稿》), Bai Sai and 2,000 Ming cavalry encountered the Japanese at "the border of Jinwi and Jiksan" (which is where Sosapyeong is) and defeated them after joining force with the other four Ming commanders, beheading 64. Another Korean source Nanjung Chamnok (《난중잡록》 or 《亂中雜錄》) contains a rather fanciful account of the battle, in which three contingents of Ming troops employed artillery bombardment, cavalry charge, and deadly iron whips to crush a Japanese army using matchlocks and "Crane Wing Formation". A later Korean source, Mumyeong Jajib (《무명자집》 or 《無名子集》), even describes Ming army unleashing hundreds of "ape cavalry" to disrupt the Japanese before crushing them with a ferocious cavalry charge.

Curiously, official histories of both Ming Dynasty and Joseon Dynasty, i.e. Veritable Records of the Ming Emperor Shenzong and Annals of King Seonjo, do not mention this battle at all, and records about this battle only date to 17th century at the earliest and contain many discrepancies such as getting the date wrong, believing that Japanese army was led by Katō Kiyomasa (加藤清正) rather than Kuroda Nagamasa and Mōri Hidemoto, as well as confusing or conflating it with Battle of Jiksan.

Given the silence of official histories and low reliability of other sources, Battle of Sosapyeong almost seem like a fabricated fiction in the same vein as Battle of Bantan (Note: Patron-only content), if not for the fact that some contemporary sources do attest or allude to its existence. For example, Xing Jie repeatedly praised Bai Sai for his bravery and exploits at Jiksan, even though Bai Sai clearly did not participate in the October 17 battle. This strongly hints that another battle took place at around the same area but on a different date. Moreover, Korean source Soemirok (《쇄미록》 or 《瑣尾錄》), a war diary written by a Korean refugee who wandered all over Korea to escape the conflict, also describes a battle at "the border of Jinwi and Yangseong" where Ming army led by Po Gui encountered some "Koreans", only this time Ming troops saw through the disguise and attacked immediately, forcing the Japanese to retreat to Jiksan. Japanese army then split up, with one of the contingents noted to be heading towards Juksan. Soemirok's account matches with known Japanese activities around the same time, as Anseong City and Juksan came under Japanese attack on October 20, 1597, three days after Battle of Jiksan.

Japanese activities on October 20, 1597 (click to enlarge).

As such, at best it can be surmised that Battle of Sosapyeong most likely did happen, although whether or not Japanese troops disguised as Koreans a second time, and whether or not Ming army beheaded 64, remain uncertain. In any case, the battle seems like an insignificant skirmish of little import, considering official histories of both Ming Dynasty and Joseon Dynasty couldn't be bothered to record it.

Analysis

Battle of Jiksan was a battle where both sides claim victory, although analysis of the various sources reveals that Japanese army prevailed over Ming army and forced the latter to retreat, lending credence to the Japanese claim. Nevertheless, it is also obvious that Ma Gui wouldn't expect a mere 2,000 cavalry to stop the entire Japanese Army of the Right, which numbered 65,300 troops, dead on its track (Ming army couldn't possibly know how many Japanese troops will turn up during Battle of Jiksan beforehand). As such, Battle of Jiksan was most likely intended to be a delaying action to slow down Japanese advance, rather than a decisive battle to defeat them. From this perspective, it is also fair to say that Ming army accomplished its objective.

For some reasons, both Battle of Jiksan and Battle of Sosapyeong were subjected to increased (and undue) attention after the war ended. Post war, privately-composed histories described the battles in flowery prose and exaggerated their significance and impact, and view that Battle of Jiksan broke the Japanese advance started to crop up and gain popularity. Regrettably, such view eventually crept into modern historiography of Imjin War, leading to an oft-repeated myth that "Jiksan was the furthest the Japanese ever got towards reaching Hanseong (Seoul)", which can be easily debunked by the fact that Japanese army raided Anseong and Juksan, both located at the north of Jiksan.

In truth, both Battle of Jiksan and Battle of Sosapyeong did little to stem the Japanese advance. Contemporary accounts from Hanseong show that the Koreans were in a state of panic, which was only exacerbated after news of the fall of Anseong and Juksan reached Hanseong, as the Japanese just opened up a new route to attack Hanseong directly, bypassing Ming defensive line at Suwon. The only Joseon army that was available on short notice, that of commander Yi Gyeong-jun (이경준 or 李慶濬), was tiny in size and holed up in Gwacheon behind the back of Ming army, refusing to either join force with the Chinese or interdict potential Japanese advance from another direction. Even King Yi Yeon of Joseon expressed despair in the face of the hopeless situation, and his court was swarmed with pleads and plans of evacuation. On the Ming side, the Chinese hardly fared any better than the Koreans. Panic began to spread after Ming troops witnessed first-hand the overwhelming numbers of Japanese army, not to mention Ming garrison at Suwon was now under serious risk of being attacked from the rear by the Japanese contingent that took a detour to Juksan. As a result, many were contemplating a full retreat from Korea.

Given the situation, Regulator (經理) of Korean military affairs Yang Hao (楊鎬) decided to intervene to stabilise the panic. He planned to make a trip to Suwon on October 22, 1597 to encourage Ming troops at the frontline, but was stopped at last minute by Ma Gui, as the latter was unwilling to put one of the highest ranking commanders of Ming army in Korea at risk of being outflanked. As a compromise, Yang Hao and Ma Gui forced King Yi Yeon to come with them on a military review outside the city of Hanseong, then a tour of Ming defensive positions along Han River, then another military review near Gwanaksa Mountain on the other side of Han River. These acts served to remind the king that Ming army will continue to protect Joseon Kingdom, while at the same time reassure Korean public that their king will not abandon them unlike the first invasion. Though nothing more than posturing and public displays, by "volunteering" King Yi Yeon to venture beyond the safety of city walls and place himself in (symbolic) danger, Yang Hao managed to calm down the panic somewhat.

As such, it's clear from Korean reaction and Yang Hao's action that the actual situation after Battle of Jiksan was the complete opposite of popular narrative. Not only Japanese advance wasn't stopped, it was the Ming army that had been visibly shaken.

Unexpected retreat

In a surprising twist of fate, the dreaded Japanese attack on Hanseong never came. Japanese army began to pull back to the southern coasts of Korea, much to the confusion of both Chinese and Koreans. The sudden retreat was not caused by any effort on the part of Chinese and Koreans, but simply due to a retreat order from Toyotomi Hideyoshi (豊臣秀吉), as well as the looming Korean winter. In particular, Mōri Hidemoto already received Hideyoshi's order while he was still at Gongju, while the rest of the Army of the Right (that did not take part in Battle of Jiksan) agreed to a decision to retreat on a military council held on October 19, 1597. Given the time-delay of relaying messages between Japan and Korea, Hideyoshi must have issued said order weeks if not months earlier, so it was simply impossible for Battle of Jiksan, Battle of Sosapyeong, and Battle of Myeongnyang for that matter, to be the cause of the retreat.

Regardless of the actual reason though, it would be idiotic to not capitalise on such godsend opportunity. Ming army began a pursuit almost immediately, chasing Mōri Hidemoto all the way to Cheongju and beheaded hundreds of Japanese troops in a series of skirmishes (Kuroda Nagamasa took a different route of retreat and evaded Ming army).

Thus ended the crisis of Hanseong and Battle of Jiksan saga. However, the real turning point of the second invasion had yet to come...

Reference

Much of the information in this article are taken from the well-researched 《万历朝鲜战争全史》 authored by Zhu Er Dan (朱尔旦), a.k.a. the critic of Samuel Hawley's book, coupled with some of my own researches. I highly recommend anyone interested in learning more about Imjin War (and can read Chinese) to buy a copy of this book.

Further reading

I've prepared some extra contents for Battle of Jiksan which are exclusive to my Supporter-tier Patrons! The article is best read as a companion article to this one and can be accessed here. If you like my work, please support me via Patreon!

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Qian Dan Yi Wo Feng (鉛彈一窩蜂)

Qian Dan Yi Wo Feng (鉛彈一窩蜂)

Drawing of Qian Dan Yi Wo Feng in shoulder bag for transportation (top right), and the same cannon when deployed (top bottom), from 'Wu Bei Ji Yao (《武備集要》)'.

Qian Dan Yi Wo Feng was a portable anti-personnel cannon that entered Ming arsenal in the early to mid-sixteenth century. Forged with the same method as a matchlock gun barrel, Qian Dan Yi Wo Feng had a short but wide body that could be loaded with up to 100 lead bullets, yet was light enough to be carried by a single person. It also came with a small iron bipod, which was used to prop up the muzzle when the cannon was staked to the ground for firing, as it had little to no extra weight to offset its considerable recoil.

Qian Dan Yi Wo Feng was also known as Bai Zi Chong (百子銃, lit. 'Hundred bullets gun'), although it should not to be confused with another weapon of the same name. It may also be the predecessor of Hu Dun Pao (虎蹲砲).

Volley gun version

Drawing of a matchlock volley gun Yi Wo Feng, from 'Wu Bei Ji Yao (《武備集要》)'.

This version of Yi Wo Feng, though still called by the same name, was only inspired by but not directly related to the anti-personnel cannon above. It was actually a matchlock volley gun that consisted of four to six gun barrels recycled from damaged matchlock guns, modified and bundled together and mounted on a wooden receiver that also housed a matchlock mechanism and a handle bar. The volley gun was mounted on a tripod-like gun mount that allowed the gun to be freely traversed and elevated, and each of its gun barrels was loaded with four lead bullets.

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Du Huo Fei Pao (毒火飛砲)

Drawing of a paper fuse (top right), paper sealing tube (middle right), wooden fuse (top bottom), shell casing (top left) and bombard (bottom left), from 'Wu Bei Ji Yao (《武備集要》)'.

Du Huo Fei Pao (毒火飛砲, lit. 'Poisonous fire flying cannon') was a bombard-launched explosive shell designed to be launched from Wan Kou Pao (碗口砲, lit. 'Bowl-muzzle cannon'), an ordinary stone-throwing bronze bombard already in widespread use since the founding of Ming Dynasty.

First appeared in late 15th/early 16th century and entered mass production by 1544 at the latest, Du Huo Fei Pao was a spherical cast iron shell filled with black powder and up to five liang of sulfur, arsenic and other poisonous substance/irritants (hence the name "poisonous fire"), and was equipped with a fuse known as Mu Xin (木信, lit. 'Wooden fuse'), which consisted of burning fuse(s) winded around a screw-threaded wooden rod and sealed inside a thick paper tube to prevent premature contact between the fuse and bursting charge inside the shell. A cleverly designed ignition device, Mu Xin allowed for easy adjustment of time-delay before detonation through increasing or decreasing the number of threads on the wooden rod (and thus the length of the burning fuse).

Despite its ingenuity, Mu Xin did have some drawbacks, namely It was a fairly complicated device assembled from three different components (burning fuse, wooden rod and paper tube), not to mention hand-carving screw threads onto a wooden rod took considerable amount of skill and time. Fortunately, an alternative that offered similar level of consistency whilst being far easier to made was later discovered. Known as Zhi Xin (紙信, lit. 'Paper fuse'), this alternative fuse was simply the motor part of a Chinese rocket being adapted into a fuse.

EXTRA: Bigyeok Jincheonroe (비격진천뢰 or 飛擊震天雷)

Drawing of a large Bigyeok Jincheonroe, from 'Yungwon pilbi (《융원필비》 or 《戎垣必備》)'.

Bigyeok Jincheonroe was a cast iron shrapnel shell invented in Joseon Dynasty Korea by weapon engineer Yi Jangson (이장손 or 李長孫) in 1591, and proved instrumental in the liberation of Gyeongju city from Japanese invaders during Imjin War that broke out one year after its invention.

Named after another Chinese weapon, Bigyeok Jincheonroe bore a striking resemblance to Du Huo Fei Pao even down to design of the fuse based on screw-threaded wooden rod, which suggests that its invention may be inspired by Du Huo Fei Pao. Nevertheless, there were some notable differences between the two as well, chief among them material of the sealing tube—the Koreans used a bamboo tube whereas the Chinese used a paper tube—which likely influenced the design of the fuse hole as well. Specifically, Bigyeok Jincheonroe had a large rectangular fuse hole with a matching iron lid, but this was not found on Du Huo Fei Pao (which had a normal round fuse hole). This was due to the fact that bamboo is relatively rigid and smooth-surfaced, which may cause the fuse to slip out of the hole if it is not pinned in place by the iron lid. In contrast, paper is supple and coarse and serves as natural wadding, allowing the fuse to fit snugly into the hole like a stopper.

Bamboo sealing tube (left), iron lid (middle), and bomb casing of a Bigyeok Jincheonroe with a squarish fuse hole (right).

Interestingly, the Koreans also never appeared to adopt the more convenient Zhi Xin fuse.

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Patreon supporter only: The twenty-four generals of Yue Gang (月港)

Scenic photo of Yuegang Ancient Town, now a tourist attraction.

Several months ago I explored the story of Zhang Lian (張璉), self-appointed Flying Dragon Emperor, which provides us a rare and interesting case study of a Chinese-led rebellion during Jia Jing Da Wo Kou (嘉靖大倭寇), and how different it was compared to Japanese-style Wokou raids that happened contemporaneously. For this month we will be looking at Twenty-four generals of Yue Gang (月港, lit. 'Moon harbour'), who despite their fancy name were bona fide smugglers, but of a very different nature to typical Chinese collaborators of Wokou.

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War cart regiment of Zeng Xian

Satellite map of modern Hetao region. 

The plan to reclaim Hetao

The region known as Hetao (河套) is a collection of flood plains located in northwestern China. Consists of vast grasslands in stark contrast to its arid desert/steppe surroundings, Hetao region has historically been of utmost strategic importance to both China and its nomadic enemies, as its fertile grasslands are suitable for pastoral and agricultural activities, making it an ideal staging ground for nomadic incursion into China's heartlands, while at the same time also served as an important source of warhorse for sedentary Chinese dynasties as well as allowing the Chinese to station large numbers of troops here as the first line of defence against steppe incursions.

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