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| Armoured cavalry escorting a general and a mandarin. From 'Kang Wo Tu Juan (《抗倭圖卷》)'. |
As Ming empire began to weaken, its once-mighty military machine based on
Wei Suo (衛所) system also fell into disarray. Soldiers were undertrained and underpaid, and desertion became increasingly rampant. Realising the worrying decline of the army's combat strength, some Ming generals took it upon themselves to recruit and train better troops out of their own personal pockets. However, Ming Dynasty laws explicitly forbid its generals to raise private armies, so these generals exploited a loophole in the law — by categorising these private troops as
Jia Ding (家丁), or "housemen/house servants" instead of soldiers. Thus was the origin of the Jia Ding system.
Jia Ding was also known by a great variety of other names, such as
Jia Ren (家人, lit. 'Family member'),
Qin Bing (親兵, lit. 'Close soldier'),
Jia Bing (家兵, lit 'House troop'),
Jia Zhong (家衆, lit . 'Family crowd'),
Cang Tou (蒼頭, lit. 'Blue head') and so on. Unlike regular troops, Jia Ding owe allegiance to their commanders, rather than to the state, which drew parallel to
housecarl as well as
druzhina. True to their status as elite troops, Jia Ding enjoyed several times the pay of regular troops, as well as a slew of other benefits. However, the money did not come easy, so many generals resorted to various legally dubious means such as monopolising local business activities, confiscating farmlands originally given to Wei Suo for personal profit, and raiding nomadic settlements for loot to increase their income.
During the reign of Emperor Shenzong, the law was laxed and Ja Ding became officially recognised by the state. Ming generals started to receive financial support from the government to pay for their private armies, and Jia Ding changed from answering solely to their commanders into a status of dual allegiance to both their commanders and the state (although in practice their loyalties still laid with their commanders). Ming government also raised a number of Jia Ding directly without intermediates. These government-employed Jia Ding were known as
Zai Ying Jia Ding (在營家丁, lit. 'In-regiment Jia Ding'), contrasting the dual allegiance Jia Ding called
Sui Ren Jia Ding (隨任家丁, lit. ''Accompanying Jia Ding').
Recruitment
Since Jia Ding were private troops of Ming generals, there was no standard criteria or method of recruitment. In general, most Jia Ding were recruited from the following sources:
1. Existing Wei Suo troops
Due to the decline of Wei Suo system, many soldiers from military households found themselves no longer able to support their livelihood. As such, they turned to their commanders (instead of the state) for help, and were eventually absorbed into their commanders' private armies, even though they still retained their position as Wei Suo troops nominally. Other soldiers simply worked with their commanders for a long time, forming a strong bond with their superiors in the process. These soldiers were hand-picked by their commanders to become Jia Ding.
2. Direct enlistment
The decline of Wei Suo system also forced the Ming government to transition into an enlistment-based army, recruiting volunteer salaried troops to supplement the increasingly unreliable Wei Suo troops. Many generals took advantage of this new system and recruited Jia Ding alongside regular troops. After the existence of Jia Ding became officially recognised and approved, this became the preferred method to recruit new Jia Ding. In fact, even Ministry of War recruited Jia Ding using this method at times.
3. Surrendered POW and foreigners
The was the major source of Jia Ding among commanders of various border garrisons, as well as generals that campaigned in foreign lands. Mongols and Jurchens made up of the majority of foreign Jia Ding, although some generals also recruited among China's ethnic minorities, Koreans, Japanese, Southeast Asians, Indians, and even Africans.
4. Border dwellers
Border dwellers that lived beyond the protection of Great Wall were often the first victims of nomadic raids and oppression. Many border dwellers turned to border generals for financial support and protection, and were recruited into their private armies. Border dwellers were especially valued for their hardiness, local knowledge, and familiarity with nomadic culture. Many of them worked as agents for their commanders in a capacity not unlike that of
Jian Er Shou (尖兒手) and Ye Bu Shou (夜不收).
5. Criminals and penal troops
Many border generals weren't picky about the background of their private armies and recruited from criminals and penal troops alike. These people were often the more problematic part of Jia Ding. Some Jia Ding with criminal background were loyal to the death due to being given a second chance in life, while others had a penchant of causing troubles and may even betray their commanders.
Equipment
Given their diverse backgrounds and expertise, Jia Ding did not have any standardised equipment, and were generally equipped to suit their own or their commander's preference. As elite unit, they were provided with equipment of the highest quality, so many of them inevitably ended up as armoured cavalry, heavy infantry, or specialists such as sharpshooters and divers. Particularly wealthy generals also hired blacksmiths and gunsmiths to manufacture equipment for Jia Ding.
Organisation and tactics
Early Jia Ding were few in numbers, so they usually served as their commander's retinues, dispersed among regular troops, or formed skirmishing/raiding parties that operated away from the main army.
After the practice became more commonplace, many generals began raising Jia Ding-only regiments with more sophisticated organisational and command structure. These Jia Ding regiments served as rapid response force against small-scale nomadic raid, as well as elite shock troops during larger campaign. A few forethoughtful generals became wary that Jia Ding and regular troops had become essentially two distinct armies with little to no cooperation, coordination and communication. They advocated for joint training and tactical planning that incorporate both, although their effort yielded only mixed results.
By late Ming period, the practice of recruiting Jia Ding had become so rampant that some wealthy generals privatised entire armies and essentially turned into powerful warlords.
Short-term relief, long-term consequences
Jia Ding were highly motivated, well-trained and well-equipped troops with very high battle-readiness. They rose to prominence during the decline of Wei Suo system, and quickly became the backbone of Ming military machine. It can be said that these elite troops prevented a complete military breakdown of Ming Dynasty and were crucial in securing China's territories.
Unfortunately, Jia Ding were very expensive to maintain. In fact, their high upkeep became a huge drain to the economy, so much so that Ming government tried several times to limit and reduce their numbers (to no avail). Many generals also recruited ever-increasing numbers of able-bodied men from Ming armies to become Jia Ding, embezzled money meant for regular troops to pay their private armies, and even forced regular troops to become servants to Jia Ding. These issues created a negative feedback loop that exacerbate the decline of the rest of Ming military.
