Movie review: Noryang: Deadly Sea

The sequel to The Admiral: Roaring Currents and Hansan: Rising Dragon, and the epic finale of Yi Sun-sin trilogy, is finally being released digitally! Being the Imjin War enthusiast that I am, of course I wouldn't pass up the chance to review what director Kim Han-min has in store for his audience!

A bit of running joke: Hey, it's commander Yi Ung-ryong (이운룡 or 李雲龍) again! Reprised by the same actor! For reasons unknown he is always the first Joseon commander I recognise.

Noryang: Deadly Sea revolves around the titular Battle of Noryang, the last major battle of Imjin War and the climax of the entire war. This makes it a much easier battle to adapt into a good story/movie, which allows the movie to be largely (albeit not completely) free of the numerous narrative problems that plagued Hansan: Rising Dragon. This is not to say Noryang: Deadly Sea is superior to its prequel, however. In many ways, it is worse.

(Major spoilers ahead, be warned!)

Production issues

The perk of Hanzi writing system: Korean and Chinese communicating by writing is both historically accurate and a great chance to have narrator and actors speak Korean without looking out of place. Unfortunately, the director insisted on using cringe Chinese even when Chinese characters are not verbally communicating. 

Production issues are the least of the movie's many problems, so I am going to mention them first. My first complaint about Noryang: Deadly Sea is that the Chinese language in this movie is atrociously cringe to a native speaker, to the point that I must pause the movie to clear my head every time anyone speaks any Chinese. To be fair, this isn't really a production issue per se (all actors are Korean so it's understandable that they can't speak Chinese), although the production team really should consider hiring some Chinese actors or just dub over the Chinese part.

Yi Sun-sin vomiting blood.

Personal gripe with the language aside, there are definitely some pacing issues with the movie. This is particularly egregious during a scene where the titular character, Yi Sun-shin (이순신 or 李舜臣) suddenly sees hallucination of his deceased son, calls out the names of his comrades one by one as if bidding farewell to them, and vomits blood out of nowhere—BEFORE he was fatally shot by a Japanese gunner. I have a sneaking suspicion that executive meddling forced the director to pad out the length of his movie to the detriment of storytelling. In any case, pacing issues will likely be fixed if the director later releases a Redux/director's cut version of the movie like he did for Hansan: Rising Dragon.

Ming soldiers beating Japanese captives to a pulp.

Thirdly, remember that I said I enjoyed the build-up portion of Hansan: Rising Dragons for all the wrong reasons? Well, the build-up portion of Noryang: Deadly Sea is largely free of the narrative issues of its prequel, but this ironically means that it now bores me to death, as I no longer have any reason, not even wrong one, to enjoy this convoluted mess. I am not even sure if the flashback and minor plot of Yi Sun-sin's dead son is really necessary when the central theme of the story isn't that of personal vendetta, but "to end the war on our terms we must pursue the enemy to the very edge of the (Japanese) archipelago.". Speaking of which, I am well aware this that this is a nationalistic movie and all, but surely such vindictive message can't be the right moral to convey to the audience?

Sea of inferno: Battle of Noryang on the silver screen

Joseon fleet splitting the Japanese fleet in two. Depiction of pre-modern naval battle of such scale, in complete darkness no less, is probably an industry's first.

Historical accounts of Battle of Noryang are rather light on finer details, which give plenty of room for creative liberty. For example, there's nothing in the historical records that describes the Koreans deploying hwacha during this battle, or the Japanese using captured cannons to sink turtle ships, but there's nothing to suggest they DIDN'T either. Thus, free from historical restrictions such as Yi Sun-sin's famous Hak Ik-jin (鶴翼陣), the director was able to let his imagination run wild, and I commend him for delivering such blood-pumping battle sequences. Moreover, barring a few exceptions all characters acted in a mostly logical and coherent manner, and the battle tactics and counter-tactics sensible and convincing, both of which make for an enjoyable watching experience. Regrettably, later portion of the naval action was overshadowed by overly drawn-out, soap opera-esque montages of Yi Sun-sin's final moments and death, although this doesn't detract from the fact that it was great while it lasted.

Nevertheless, despite the enjoyable battle scenes, there are indeed some exceptions, or one might say plot holes, that detract from the overall story. Chief among them are the war fleet of Konishi Yukinaga (小西行長), Chen Lin acting out of character, and the battle that ends at dawn. They will be elaborated below:

Konishi Yukinaga's pristine war fleet

Konishi Yukinaga's fleet.

The story begins with Konishi Yukinaga holed up inside Suncheon Castle due to a joint Ming-Joseon naval blockade, with supply running so low his soldiers were on the verge of resorting to cannibalism. If that is the case, then where did he find/hide such a massive fleet of warships? And why didn't Yi Sun-sin do something about these ships before they become a problem, i.e. destroy them during the blockade?

Chen Lin acting out of character

Chen Lin ordering Ming navy to attack.

In this film, Ming admiral Chen Lin is portrayed as a calculating coward that took bribes and spent the better part of the film trying to distance himself from Yi Sun-sin's war to avoid more bloodshed. Yet during a crucial moment he suddenly ordered Ming navy to press the attack seriously, only to end up with his own flagship boarded by the Japanese. This abrupt change of mind is entirely out of character for Chen Lin's risk-averse portrayal up until that point, and it appears that the director forcibly handed him an idiot ball for no reason other than to set up a "Yi Sun-sin heroically save the Ming admiral from danger" moment.

The battle that ends at dawn

Yi Sun-sin's plan to annihilate Shimazu Yoshihiro's fleet before dawn.

Having the epic struggle to be over by daybreak gives a nice touch of symbolism, signifying the nightmare that terrorised Korea for the past seven years is finally over, and new hope arise. Historically, the turning point of  Battle of Noryang also happened around dawn (although the battle itself continued well into the morning), so that checks out. So why is this a problem?

Shimazu Yoshihiro's subordinate urges him to retreat because "time is running out".

Konishi Yukinaga sounds the retreat, leaving Shimazu Yoshihiro out to dry.

Well, the time when the battle ended isn't a problem. It's only when Yi Sun-sin explicitly set a time limit that he must defeat the Japanese before dawn, Shimazu Yoshihiro became increasingly agitated as daybreak drew near, and Konishi Yukinaga acted as if he was too late after arriving at the scene by dawn, that it become problematic. Why? Because while the battle happens to be over by dawn, there isn't any particular reason that it couldn't, or shouldn't, go on for longer. In essence, by racing against this arbitrary time limit, the characters both good and bad are making decisions based on out-of-story knowledge they couldn't possibly know.

As to why serious plot holes like this can crop up in an otherwise fairly coherent story, this brings me to my next point...

Stolen shine: a sad attempt at ego-boosting

Yi Sun-sin beating the war drum.

At its core, Noryang: Deadly Sea is a nationalistic flick under the guise of historical movie. Attempts to shape the titular hero Yi Sun-sin into a saint among men, and to a lesser extend make the Koreans look good and heroic while everyone else either bad or helpless, permeate throughout the story, dialogues, and character portrayals, some overt, other indirect and subtle. Naturally, in such work historical realities are more of a hindrance than a boon. They are inconvenient truth that must be distorted to serve the narrative, not the other way around.

Shimazu Yoshihiro reading the secret letter sent to him by Konishi Yukinaga.

To illustrate, in a secret letter Konishi Yukinaga warned Shimazu Yoshihiro that Yi Sun-sin might counter-invade Japan after the war. This obviously untrue statement may appear to be just another off-handed chest thumping to make Yi Sun-sin look good and Joseon Kingdom appear more powerful than it really was (which is usually par of the course for a nationalistic movie but relatively harmless, although not in this case), however it actually underpins much of the history distortions that shape the movie's story, and the plot holes that come with such alterations. 

You see, in the historical version of Battle of Noryang, Konishi Yukinaga simply packed up and slipped away from Suncheon Castle while the battle raged on. However, in order to glorify Yi Sun-sin, the director made him a dangerous commander that the Japanese simply could not ignore (even after they lost the war), necessitating the antagonists to hatch a nefarious plot to defeat him, which in turn necessitating Konishi Yukinaga to conjure a war fleet out of thin air to threaten Yi Sun-sin with. Thus, a plot hole came into being. 

It also necessitates Yi Sun-sin using decoys to delay Konishi Yukinaga, rather than...you know, smash his idle fleet before he had a chance to use it.

Likewise, that Chen Lin was the supreme commander that led the allied navy to victory during Battle of Noryang, and Ming navy actually did most of the legworks during the battle, are all inconvenient historical facts to the director's story that must be written off/away. There's a reason why Battle of Noryang played out so differently from Yi Sun-sin's other naval victories, for instance the unusually heavy use of incendiary weapons, little aversion to boarding combat, and the main artillery being Chinese Hu Dun Pao (虎蹲砲) rather than the usual Joseon Chongtong (총통 or 銃筒). But nope, can't have that, Yi Sun-sin must hoard all the spotlights! So Chen Lin is portrayed as a coward that tried to avoid battle at all cost, while Chinese Huo Qiu (火毬) and Pen Tong (噴筒) are being replaced by unimaginative oil pots hand-thrown by Joseon troops then ignited with fire arrows. 

Which, in turn, created the plot hole of Chen Lin abruptly change from a coward to a Leeroy Jenkins in the span of like two scenes. Why? Because the director wanted to make sure Yi Sun-sin look good by heroically saving his inept Chinese ally from danger. Historically, it was Yi Sun-sin's ship that got surrounded by the Japanese first, then Chen Lin charged in to save Yi Sun-sin, only to cause the Japanese switch target and surround him instead. The freed Yi Sun-sin then returned to help Chen Lin, and the two fought side by side until dawn. Alas, such moving tale of fire-forged camaraderie, butchered into a plot hole-ridden ego boosting.

And what about the dawn?

The breaking of the dawn.

By itself, various characters in the movie subconsciously racing against an arbitrary time limit is a relatively minor problem, more of a director oversight or dialogue slip than a story-ruining plot hole. However, the fact that such oversight can exist in the first place shows that the director probably did his historical homework—but chose to discard historical events that inconvenience his narrative anyway. Why? Because one notable event did take place at dawn—Deng Zilong (鄧子龍) came in gun blazing and saved the day!

Deng Zilong, an old soldier by the time of his death (he used to be a commander but was demoted to the rank of common soldier before entering Korea), was the last of the major characters to join the fray, but the first to set fire to Japanese warships. His success prompted Chen Lin and other Ming ships to follow suit with their own incendiary weapons, and this was what caused the Japanese to finally break ranks and flee. Unfortunately, his ship was hit by friendly fire during pursuit, and the ensuing chaos allowed Japanese troops to board the vessel and kill nearly all hands aboard. Due to Deng Zilong's low rank and relative obscurity, the Japanese didn't realise they had killed someone of significance until centuries later, so no one at the time claimed credit for his death. 

Deceased son ex machina

Drum-inflicted PTSD.

Bah, can't have that either. There's no way the director will allow another heroic sacrifice to detract from Yi Sun-sin's own, so nothing in particular happened at dawn in the film (despite everyone keeping track of the time limit). Well, nothing except Yi Sun-sin suddenly saw a vision of his deceased son who prompted him to start beating the war drum, and this inspired the good guys to fight harder while inflicting a psychological meltdown on the villain Shimazu Yoshihiro so horrid he ran to cower in his room and literally start vomiting (no really).

Deng Zilong getting his head sliced off by Shimazu Yoshihiro.

As for Deng Zilong, he was reduced by director to what can be described as "Yi Sun-sin's believer", an inferior who was "redeemed" and was so devout to the hero that he put him above all others and strove to emulate him, going so far as to confronting his own superior and attacking without order. Too bad the hero's imitator is not the hero himself, so Deng Zilong died an unceremonious death without accomplishing anything.

Chen Chan died a speed bump to Shimzau Yoshihiro's villainy.

Shen Li getting shanked by Japanese troops.

Moreover, as if Deng Zilong's death still wasn't enough to rub it in, the director then decided to kill off minor Ming commander Chen Chan (陳蠶) to re-emphasise Chinese incompetence, and make another minor Ming commander Shen Li (沈理) undergo some kind of foxhole conversion (except he didn't convert to Christianity but to Yi Sun-sin), and found redemption in valiant death—better to die fighting like a Korean than live like a coward! Never mind that both of them survived the war, and Chen Chan even stayed in Korea for two more years (he returned to China in 1600). Because why let history get in the way of the stirring tall tale of our lord and saviour Yi Sun-sin?

I know, Noryang: Deadly Sea is a nationalistic movie, so some measures of embellishment and glorifications of the titular hero are inevitable. But doing it in such blatantly denigrating manner, even to allies, it just seems so...tactless and petty.

Further reading

My patrons get an one month early access to the additional commentary and trivia that I've write for this movie, which can be accessed here! If you like my work, please support me via Patreon!

A brief overview of Yi Sun-sin's contribution to Imjin War is also available to my Supporter-tier Patrons!

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Patreon supporter only: Xu Chao Guang (許朝光), Yelang Beyond the Sea

Wokou engaging in rape and pillage, from 'Tai Ping Kang Wo Tu (《太平抗倭圖》)'.

In the previous months I've covered some Jia Jing Da Wo Kou (嘉靖大倭寇) topics, namely Zhang Lian (張璉), who was a mountain bandit being mistaken as Wokou, as well as Twenty-four Generals of Yue Gang (月港), who were a rare case of grassroots attempt to participate in smuggling/piratical activities. For this article though, I will cover another famous pirate lord named Xu Chao Guang (許朝光). In many ways, Xu Chao Guang was a quintessential Wokou, however he only became active during the later phases of Jia Jing Da Wo Kou, when Ming coastal defence began to improve, many notorious Chinese Wokou leaders had been wiped out, and the inflow of Japanese Wokou began to dry out. Thus, his piratical activities showed signs of transitioning from Wokou/Japanese-based piracy practices into Chinese-style piracy.

This article is exclusive to my Supporter-tier Patrons and can be accessed here. If you like my work, please support me via Patreon!

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Battle of Jiksan

This illustration actually depicts Battle of Byeokjegwan rather than Battle of Jiksan, hence the snowy terrain. Unfortunately there is a serious lack of modern illustration of Battle of Jiksan, so I have to make do with what I can find. The particular painting is the handiwork of Feng Zi Jian (冯子建).

Prelude

The complete destruction of Joseon navy during Battle of Chilcheollyang thoroughly upended the defence landscape of Korea. Joseon army, still reeling from the devastation of the previous Japanese invasion, could not offer any meaningful resistance to the renewed Japanese onslaught, and the responsibility of defending Korea thus disproportionately fell on the shoulders of Ming army, of which there were only 12,000 Ming troops scattered around Korea at the time.

Japanese army met its first serious opposition at Namwon, which guards a critical mountain pass connecting Gyeongsang Province and Jeolla Province. Unfortunately, it was impossible for 3,000 Ming troops and 700 Joseon troops in a poorly fortified city to resist a besieging force of 56,800 troops, and Siege of Namwon ended in Japanese victory in just four days.

The fall of Namwon spooked the Ming garrison at Jeonju to immediately abandon the city and retreat to Gongju. From then on, Japanese army met no further challenge and was able to rampage through Jeolla and Chungcheong Province unopposed. The vast majority of Joseon leadership and military garrisons of the two provinces abandoned their duty and fled, and Japanese troops actually spent more time looting, torching villages and rooting out Korean refugees hiding in the mountains to be massacred than fighting (they were far more violent and cruel during the second invasion than the first). As Japanese army steadily drew closer to Hanseong (present-day Seoul), capital city of Joseon Kingdom, Ming armies at Gongju and Chunju were also recalled to Hanseong to bolster its defence. Gongju subsequently fell into Japanese hands.

To prevent Japanese army from marching straight to Hanseong without anyone standing in its way, Ming military commissioner of Korea Xing Jie (邢玠), who was at Liaodong at the time, issued an order to Military superintendent Ma Gui (麻貴), asking him to send Ming army to defend Jiksan and Cheonan City. Upon receiving his order, Ma Gui dispatched Jie Sheng, Po Gui, Yang Deng Shan and Niu Bo Ying to lead 2,000 Ming cavalry (which were all Ming army could spare at the time) and head south to interdict Japanese army. Unfortunately, due to time-delay of relaying messages between Liaodong and Hanseong, Cheonan had already fallen into Japanese hands. As thus, Ming army wasn't able to enter Cheonan as originally planned, and had to set up an ambush between Jiksan and Cheonan.

The Battlefield

Ming army went all the way from Hanseong to Jiksan to interdict Japanese army (click to enlarge).

Battle of Jiksan was a meeting engagement between Ming army and Japanese army that happened at roughly 4 km south of Jiksan.

Belligerents

Ming army

Commander: Jie Sheng (解生), Po Gui (頗貴), Yang Deng Shan (楊登山), Niu Bo Ying (牛伯英)

Total strength: 15 officers, 2,000 cavalry

Casualties: 85 noses collected by Kuroda Nagamasa's army after the battle*, 150~160 claimed dead

*Note: Since Ming army withdrew from battle first, thus allowing Kuroda Nagamasa to clean up the battlefield, 85 dead can be taken as the most accurate assessment of Ming casualties. Nevertheless, Ming army may or may not suffered additional casualties depending on whether it fought Mōri Hidemoto's reinforcement or not.

Japanese army

Kuroda Nagamasa's army

1) Vanguard

Commander: Kuroda Naoyuki (黒田直之), Kuriyama Toshiyasu (栗山利安), Keya Takehisa (毛屋武久)

Strength: Unknown, but in the range of 2,000+

2) Scout

Commander: Gotō Mototsugu (後藤基次), Kuroda Kazushige (黒田一成), Nomura Ichiemon (野村市右衛門)

Strength: Unknown

3) Full army (after reorganisation)

3.1) Centre Battle

Commander: Kuroda Nagamasa (黒田長政)

Strength: 2,000 troops.

3.2) Left Battle

1st Left Division Commander: Gotō Mototsugu (後藤基次), Kuroda Kazushige (黒田一成)

2nd Left Division Commander: Kuroda Naoyuki (黒田直之), Kiriyama Nobuyuki (桐山信行)

Strength: Unknown

3.3) Right Battle

1st Right Division Commander: Mori Tomonobu (母里友信), Kuriyama Toshiyasu (栗山利安), Kuroda Toshitaka (黒田利高)

2nd Right Division Commander: Inoue Kurobei (井上九郎兵衛), Nomura Ichiemon (野村市右衛門)

Strength: Unknown

Total strength: Approximately 5,000 troops

Casualties: 29-31 heads collected by Ming army, 500~600 dead claimed*

*Note: Claim given by Ming troops returning from battle and seemingly corroborated by the testimony of Fukuda Kansuke (福田勘介), a soldier of Mōri Hidemoto's army who was captured by Koreans on a later date. However, a testimony under duress may not be all that reliable.

Mōri Hidemoto's reinforcement

1) Vanguard

Commander: Shishido Mototsugu (宍戶元續)

Strength: 2,950 troops

2) Main army

Commander: Mōri Hidemoto (毛利秀元)

Strength: Unknown

Total strength: Unknown but around 25,000+

Casualties: Unknown but likely negligible

The Battle

On October 17, 1597, the vanguard of Kuroda Nagamasa's army led by Kuroda Naoyuki, Kuriyama Toshiyasu and Keya Takehisa left Cheonan City before dawn and marched north towards Jiksan. At the time, the Japanese didn't know about Ming ambush, although Kuroda Nagamasa's vanguard was able to detect the presence of Ming army before being detected in return.

Mistakenly believing (or more likely, deliberately inflating) that the number of Ming troops to be far greater than they really were, commanders of the vanguard fell into indecision. Kuroda Naoyuki wanted to retreat to rendezvous with Kuroda Nagamasa's main army before deciding the next course of action, however he was objected by Keya Takehisa, who rightly pointed out that it was impossible to outrun Ming cavalry by foot. Keya Takehisa instead suggested that the vanguard should launch a surprise attack against the still-unsuspecting Ming army, then quickly retreat amidst the chaos. He also added that Ming troops were well-protected by bullet-proof iron shields (Note: the claim about iron shields is quite dubious), thus matchlock guns should only be used to signal and cover the charge (with gun smoke), and the battle should be decided in close combat. In the end Keya Takehisa's suggestion was accepted by other commanders.

On the Ming side, Ming troops actually detected Kuroda Nagamasa's vanguard as well, but mistook them for Koreans as Japanese troops of the vanguard were dressed in white. As thus, they did not react to these "Koreans" closing in until they suddenly opened fire. Caught in a surprise, Ming troops were momentarily pushed back, but quickly regained composure as Kuroda Nagamasa's vanguard attempted to disengage from them, and began a fierce counterattack.

Meanwhile, Kuroda Nagamasa, who departed Cheonan later, was alerted by the sounds of gunshots coming from the direction of his vanguard. Hoping that his vanguard was merely using matchlock gun for hunting, Kuroda Nagamasa nevertheless ordered Gotō Mototsugu, Kuroda Kazushige and Nomura Ichiemon to scout ahead due to a sneaking suspicion that the vanguard had run into troubles. The scouts quickly arrived at the scene and saw that Kuroda Nagamasa's suspicion had indeed become reality—Ming cavalry already defeated the vanguard and chased them over an earthen bridge, and both armies entered a stand-off at either side of the bridge.

Gotō Mototsugu, who was the first scout to arrive and saw the carnage, quickly retreated to a nearby hill for safety, and called other scouts to follow suit. However, Kuroda Kazushige insisted to immediately help the vanguard and rushed to join the fray, as he was worried that since the vanguard was surrounded, Ming army could directly go after Kuroda Nagamasa if they failed to prevent a bridge crossing. He personally hopped onto the bridge and slew several Ming troops while directing the vanguard to defend the bridge, and successfully drove Ming army back after a fierce battle. Meanwhile, Gotō Mototsugu ordered his troops to create large movements on the hill to give an impression that a large Japanese army had taken control of the hilltop, in the hope that this will confuse Ming troops and delay them further. Soon after, Kuroda Nagamasa himself also arrived and climbed the hill on the east side of the battlefield to access the situation. He proclaimed that they must prepare to fight to the death as there won't be any more backup coming, then reorganised his army into three battles to engage the Chinese in pitched battle.

After the rearrangement, Mori Tomonobu, commander of the 1st Right Division, re-initiated the fight by ordering his arquebusiers to open fire. He was quickly followed by Kuriyama Toshiyasu and Gotō Mototsugu (commanders of 1st Right Division and 1st Left Division, respectively), who shouted warcries and charged Ming army. Ming troops responded by shooting volleys of arrows into Japanese ranks, then engaged them in close combat. During the chaotic melee Kuroda Kazushige, Kuroda Naoyuki, Mori Tomonobu, Kuriyama Toshiyasu and Gotō Mototsugu found themselves surrounded, although they managed to break out of encirclement with great difficulties. Seeing that his subordinates were in great danger, Kuroda Nagamasa committed his own 2,000 troops and personally joined the fight. He was soon joined by Shishido Mototsugu, who just arrived at the scene leading the vanguard of Mōri Hidemoto's army. Despite this, they still failed to gain upper hand over Ming army. Nevertheless, the situation completely overturned as the battle dragged into noon, as Mōri Hidemoto himself arrived with a large army, bringing the total number of Japanese troops at the scene to around 30,000.

What happened next varies depending on the source. Most Chinese and Korean sources, and some Japanese sources, agree that Ming army bailed as fast as it could at the sight of Mōri Hidemoto's massive reinforcement. However, Mōri Kaki (『毛利家記』, i.e. Mōri Clan Records) claims that Mōri Hidemoto slaughtered many thousands of Ming troops and saved Kuroda Nagamasa from the brink of danger. Survivors of the slaughter fled to a nearby hill and dispatched a translator to Mōri Hidemoto to beg for mercy, which he gracefully granted and let them go. While it is clear that this record is heavily biased and exaggerated (Ming army wasn't large enough to be able to afford the loss of "many thousands" of troops), the possibility that Mōri Hidemoto did briefly fight Ming army, rather than Ming army immediately retreating without engaging him, cannot be completely ruled out.

In any case, and regardless of which source to believe, thus ended Battle of Jiksan.

Aftermath

Ming army quickly retreated to Jinwi after successfully disengaging. Still feeling threatened, it continued to retreat north after a short rest and meal, arriving at Suwon by evening. The news of Ming retreat quickly reached Hanseong, and upon being briefed on the latest situation, Ma Gui immediately mobilised Ming army stationed at Hanseong to guard the river crossings of Han River, knowing full well that Hanseong was at the brink of coming under direct threat. He also worried that Suwon—now the last line of defence between Hanseong and the Japanese—would soon come under attack, so he ordered Bai Sai (摆塞) to lead 2,500 elite cavalry to reinforce other Ming commanders at Suwon and interdict the coming Japanese army.

Route of retreat of the Ming army (click to enlarge).

After Ming army retreated from battle, Japanese army did not give pursuit and returned to Cheonan City for the night. The next day (October 18, 1597), it resumed advance northwards and quickly captured the now vacant Jiksan. From hereon, it appears that Japanese army continued to head north and ran into Ming army again.

The Elusive Battle of Sosapyeong

Ming army engaged Japanese army once again on October 18, 1597 (click to enlarge).

Battle of Sosapyeong was a skirmish between Ming army and Japanese army at Sosapyeong (소사평 or 素沙坪), a flat grassland north of Jiksan.

A relatively unheard of battle, what exactly transpired during Battle of Sosapyeong varies depending on the source. According to Korean source Sangchongo (《상촌고》 or 《象村稿》), Bai Sai and 2,000 Ming cavalry encountered the Japanese at "the border of Jinwi and Jiksan" (which is where Sosapyeong is) and defeated them after joining force with the other four Ming commanders, beheading 64. Another Korean source Nanjung Chamnok (《난중잡록》 or 《亂中雜錄》) contains a rather fanciful account of the battle, in which three contingents of Ming troops employed artillery bombardment, cavalry charge, and deadly iron whips to crush a Japanese army using matchlocks and "Crane Wing Formation". A later Korean source, Mumyeong Jajib (《무명자집》 or 《無名子集》), even describes Ming army unleashing hundreds of "ape cavalry" to disrupt the Japanese before crushing them with a ferocious cavalry charge.

Curiously, official histories of both Ming Dynasty and Joseon Dynasty, i.e. Veritable Records of the Ming Emperor Shenzong and Annals of King Seonjo, do not mention this battle at all, and records about this battle only date to 17th century at the earliest and contain many discrepancies such as getting the date wrong, believing that Japanese army was led by Katō Kiyomasa (加藤清正) rather than Kuroda Nagamasa and Mōri Hidemoto, as well as confusing or conflating it with Battle of Jiksan.

Given the silence of official histories and low reliability of other sources, Battle of Sosapyeong almost seem like a fabricated fiction in the same vein as Battle of Bantan (Note: Patron-only content), if not for the fact that some contemporary sources do attest or allude to its existence. For example, Xing Jie repeatedly praised Bai Sai for his bravery and exploits at Jiksan, even though Bai Sai clearly did not participate in the October 17 battle. This strongly hints that another battle took place at around the same area but on a different date. Moreover, Korean source Soemirok (《쇄미록》 or 《瑣尾錄》), a war diary written by a Korean refugee who wandered all over Korea to escape the conflict, also describes a battle at "the border of Jinwi and Yangseong" where Ming army led by Po Gui encountered some "Koreans", only this time Ming troops saw through the disguise and attacked immediately, forcing the Japanese to retreat to Jiksan. Japanese army then split up, with one of the contingents noted to be heading towards Juksan. Soemirok's account matches with known Japanese activities around the same time, as Anseong City and Juksan came under Japanese attack on October 20, 1597, three days after Battle of Jiksan.

Japanese activities on October 20, 1597 (click to enlarge).

As such, at best it can be surmised that Battle of Sosapyeong most likely did happen, although whether or not Japanese troops disguised as Koreans a second time, and whether or not Ming army beheaded 64, remain uncertain. In any case, the battle seems like an insignificant skirmish of little import, considering official histories of both Ming Dynasty and Joseon Dynasty couldn't be bothered to record it.

Analysis

Battle of Jiksan was a battle where both sides claim victory, although analysis of the various sources reveals that Japanese army prevailed over Ming army and forced the latter to retreat, lending credence to the Japanese claim. Nevertheless, it is also obvious that Ma Gui wouldn't expect a mere 2,000 cavalry to stop the entire Japanese Army of the Right, which numbered 65,300 troops, dead on its track (Ming army couldn't possibly know how many Japanese troops will turn up during Battle of Jiksan beforehand). As such, Battle of Jiksan was most likely intended to be a delaying action to slow down Japanese advance, rather than a decisive battle to defeat them. From this perspective, it is also fair to say that Ming army accomplished its objective.

For some reasons, both Battle of Jiksan and Battle of Sosapyeong were subjected to increased (and undue) attention after the war ended. Post war, privately-composed histories describe the battles in flowery prose and exaggerate their significance and impact, and view that Battle of Jiksan broke the Japanese advance started to crop up and gain popularity. Regrettably, such view eventually crept into modern historiography of Imjin War, leading to an oft-repeated myth that "Jiksan was the furthest the Japanese ever got towards reaching Hanseong (Seoul)", which can be easily debunked by the fact that Japanese army raided Anseong and Juksan, both located at the north of Jiksan.

In truth, both Battle of Jiksan and Battle of Sosapyeong did little to stem the Japanese advance. Contemporary accounts from Hanseong show that the Koreans were in a state of panic, which was only exacerbated after news of the fall of Anseong and Juksan reached Hanseong, as the Japanese just opened up a new route to attack Hanseong directly, bypassing Ming defensive line at Suwon. The only Joseon army that was available on short notice, that of commander Yi Gyeong-jun (이경준 or 李慶濬), was tiny in size and holed up in Gwacheon behind the back of Ming army, refusing to either join force with the Chinese or interdict potential Japanese advance from another direction. Even King Yi Yeon of Joseon expressed despair in the face of the hopeless situation, and his court was swarmed with pleads and plans of evacuation. On the Ming side, the Chinese hardly fared any better than the Koreans. Panic began to spread after Ming troops witnessed first-hand the overwhelming numbers of Japanese army, not to mention Ming garrison at Suwon was now under serious risk of being attacked from the rear by the Japanese contingent that took a detour to Juksan. As a result, many were contemplating a full retreat from Korea.

Given the situation, Regulator of Korean military affairs Yang Hao (楊鎬) decided to intervene to stabilise the panic. He planned to make a trip to Suwon on October 22, 1597 to encourage Ming troops at the frontline, but was stopped at last minute by Ma Gui, as the latter was unwilling to put one of the highest ranking commanders of Ming army in Korea at risk of being outflanked. As a compromise, Yang Hao and Ma Gui forced King Yi Yeon to come with them on a military review outside the city of Hanseong, then a tour of Ming defensive positions along Han River, then another military review near Gwanaksa Mountain on the other side of Han River. These acts served to remind the king that Ming army will continue to protect Joseon Kingdom, while at the same time reassure Korean public that their king will not abandon them unlike the first invasion. Though nothing more than posturing and public displays, by "volunteering" King Yi Yeon to venture beyond the safety of city walls and place himself in (symbolic) danger, Yang Hao managed to calm down the panic somewhat.

As such, it's clear from Korean reaction and Yang Hao's action that the actual situation after Battle of Jiksan was the complete opposite of popular narrative. Not only Japanese advance wasn't stopped, it was the Ming army that had been visibly shaken.

Unexpected retreat

In a surprising twist of fate, the dreaded Japanese attack on Hanseong never came. Japanese army began to pull back to the southern coasts of Korea, much to the confusion of both Chinese and Koreans. The sudden retreat was not caused by any effort on the part of Chinese and Koreans, but simply due to a retreat order from Toyotomi Hideyoshi (豊臣秀吉), as well as the looming Korean winter. In particular, Mōri Hidemoto already received Hideyoshi's order while he was still at Gongju, while the rest of the Army of the Right (that did not take part in Battle of Jiksan) agreed to a decision to retreat on a military council held on October 19, 1597. Given the time-delay of relaying messages between Japan and Korea, Hideyoshi must have issued said order weeks if not months earlier, so it was simply impossible for Battle of Jiksan, Battle of Sosapyeong, and Battle of Myeongnyang for that matter, to be the cause of the retreat.

Regardless of the actual reason though, it would be idiotic to not capitalise on such godsend opportunity. Ming army began a pursuit almost immediately, chasing Mōri Hidemoto all the way to Cheongju and beheaded hundreds of Japanese troops in a series of skirmishes (Kuroda Nagamasa took a different route of retreat and evaded Ming army).

Thus ended the crisis of Hanseong and Battle of Jiksan saga. However, the real turning point of the second invasion had yet to come...

Reference

Much of the information in this article are taken from the well-researched 《万历朝鲜战争全史》 authored by Zhu Er Dan (朱尔旦), a.k.a. the critic of Samuel Hawley's book, coupled with some of my own researches. I highly recommend anyone interested in learning more about Imjin War (and can read Chinese) to buy a copy of this book.

Further reading

I've prepared some extra contents for Battle of Jiksan which are exclusive to my Supporter-tier Patrons! The article is best read as a companion article to this one and can be accessed here. If you like my work, please support me via Patreon!

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