Special Unit of the Ming Dynasty — Jian Ye (尖夜)

Stone inscription detailing a sortie of Ye Bu Shou on Qinhuangdao Great Wall.

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Ming Chinese infantry tactics — Part 2

In my previous blog post, I briefly discussed about large formation battle in the context of Chinese warfare. However, it only gives a very rough and incomplete idea on how a large scale battle was fought. In this blog post, I will delve deeper into the subject, using actual figures, pictures, as well as comparison with Western formation to give a clearer picture on Chinese battle formation.

Individual spacing and formation frontage

Generally speaking, four typical Chinese soldier would occupy a five chi (approx. 5.35 feet or 1.63 metre) by five chi square. In other word, space between two soldiers, measured from shoulder to shoulder, is roughly 2.1 feet. For example, an early Mandarin Duck squad employed by Qi Ji Guang (戚繼光) would occupy a rectangular space of five chi wide and one zhang five chi long (5.35 feet × 16.05 feet).

Typical Chinese formation was actually incredibly spacious by European standard, as European pikemen of the sixteenth and seventeenth century fought in very dense formation, with space between two soldiers as little as 18 inches.

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Qi Ji Guang's Che Ying (車營) — Part 1

The Mongol Threat

It was no secret that the Mongols were formidable and extremely dangerous warriors. Being an all-cavalry army, their strength lay way beyond just simple mobility and deadly horse archery, but also their unpredictability and force concentration. It is quite unfathomable, at least to modern minds that are more exposed and accustomed to Western (particularly European) style of medieval warfare, that a nomadic people with but a small fraction of Chinese population and wealth could muster a vastly larger, better trained and better equipped army than the Chinese, yet for most of the Chinese-Mongol conflicts, Chinese soldiers frequently found themselves not only outmanoeuvred but also outnumbered. In fact, it was not unusual in any given conflict to have a Mongol force that fielded more horsemen than Chinese had footmen, even though a horseman was several times more expensive to train and maintain than a foot soldier.

The ability of the Mongols to concentrate their forces essentially forced the Chinese into passive defensive warfare—utilising fortresses and strongholds to balance out the force multiplier created through concentration of force. Yet due to their superior mobility the Mongols could strike at more places than Chinese could defend them, and at times of their choosing. It was under such circumstance that the Chinese invented and pioneered wagon fort tactics to defend against nomadic raids, as war carts served as "fortress that moves" that allowed Chinese troops to operate away from the protection of their fortresses.

Yet even war cart alone could not adequately defend against Mongol horsemen, whom were equally deadly in horse archery as they were in cavalry charge, and often had numerical advantage on their side. For most of China's history, Chinese troops had to rely on massed crossbows, whether handheld or vehicle-mounted, to repel these horsemen. While undoubtedly effective, Chinese crossbow was hard-pressed to match the Mongol bow.

Qi Ji Guang's Che Ying (車營, lit. 'Cart regiment')

Che Ying formed the war cart branch of the reformed Ji Defence Region army devised by Qi Ji Guang (戚繼光), and was arguably the most important unit of his reform. While it was intended to operate alongside the infantry, cavalry and logistic branch of the army, Che Ying was actually self-sufficient even when deployed alone.

Several types of war carts were used in Che Ying, which will be detailed below:

Pian Xiang Che (偏廂車, lit. 'Side cabin cart')

Drawing of a Pian Xiang Che, from 'Si Zhen San Guan Zhi (《四鎮三關志》)'.

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